

## 6

### LBJ AND WORLD POPULATION

#### *Planning the Greater Society One Family at a Time*

MATTHEW CONNELLY

Historians who excavate beneath the ruins of the Cold War to uncover the foundations of the contemporary era will hear the sound of digging beneath the surface. Eventually, if they go deep enough, they may break through and see the sweaty visage of Lyndon Johnson, determined to embrace the future. His administration continually invoked the future to orient its programs and rally public support, whether for education funding, urban planning, or environmental conservation. As president, LBJ publicly speculated about the year 2000 on at least forty occasions, typically in terms of the growing need for jobs, housing, resources, and power. He also offered projections for population size, gross national product, average family income, urbanization, and farm output. For LBJ, conservation was not just a way to keep America beautiful, it was a duty owed to “America of the future.” The University of Michigan students who listened to his first pronouncement on the Great Society heard that they would not merely have to completely rebuild the urban United States, but must “lead America toward a new age.” LBJ constantly appealed to “future generations” in asserting the importance of his work, focusing particularly on what historians would write about him. “Men will look back and say: It was then, after a long and weary way, that man turned the exploits of his genius to the full enrichment of his life.”<sup>1</sup>

Historians might dismiss this as standard political rhetoric, but it was Johnson, more than any other president, who set the standard. He also pointed to the far-off future in crucial private moments, such as his 1965 post-Selma summit with George Wallace. He told the Alabama governor to stop “looking back to 1865 and start planning for 2065.”<sup>2</sup> For LBJ it was

not enough to forecast the future, invoke posterity in justifying his policies, and appeal to the judgment of history. This future had to be planned, programmed, and budgeted, complete with cost-benefit analyses. After Robert McNamara and his “whiz kids” used systems analysis and long-range planning to tame the armed services, LBJ turned them loose on his domestic programs, from health care to the “war on poverty.” The attempt to plan a Great Society was LBJ’s most lasting legacy, including vastly increased expenditures on entitlements and social welfare programs and a shift in power from the individual states to Washington. By overcoming the challenges of racial prejudice, urban decay, and environmental pollution, the Great Society would allow the United States to retain its global leadership and provide lessons for the world.

Alas, these were sometimes hard lessons. The forecasters and systems analysts of the era could be rather cold in their calculations, beginning with their assessment of Americans’ capacity to participate in or even understand their work. Emerging from think tanks like the RAND Corporation, they came to believe that, just as the imperatives of national security in a nuclear age required deference to experts, long-range social and economic planning presented technical problems that required technical solutions. With the growth of crime and urban rebellions in the late 1960s, the state of American cities became a matter of national security, and the ideas and techniques developed for military problems began to be applied to the “war on poverty.” In their models of cities and of the world, with people, housing, industry, and pollution arranged in intricate feedback loops, systems analysts began to see long-range survival and democratic politics as a zero-sum equation.

This chapter focuses on a particular case: how the United States assumed leadership of a global campaign to control world population, and especially the reproduction of poor people and poor countries. Johnson was initially reluctant even to meet population control proponents, fearing the wrath of Catholic voters. But he was finally persuaded in part because of cost-benefit analyses of American foreign aid, which claimed that paying poor people to be sterilized would be more efficient over the long-run than building schools for their children or nurturing industries to employ them. Reacting to long-range projections of ruinous population growth and food scarcity, the United States spearheaded a rapid increase in international aid for population control. At the same time, the Johnson administration began to fund birth control clinics domestically, especially in the inner cities, which used techniques that had been tested on poor populations abroad. All along, officials based their plans on projections of a worldwide Malthusian crisis and,

within the United States, predictions of social breakdown due to the high fertility of poorer segments of the population.

By the end of his administration, Johnson had become preoccupied with population trends at home and abroad, which he saw as interconnected parts of a global problem more important than anything except the risk of nuclear war. While LBJ worried about Malthusian crises, a nascent environmentalist movement began to see population growth as a threat to the planet. They could agree that the main problem, and threat, came from the high fertility of poor people and poor countries, not the ever increasing consumption essential to the Great Society. Johnson left it to his successors to deal with a worldwide backlash against this vision of population control—beginning with Pope Paul VI's 1968 encyclical *Humanae Vitae*—and growing accusations that population control was a neocolonial plot.

The Johnson years are remembered not for rational management and long-range planning, but acute conflict at home and abroad, culminating in an unprecedented crisis of legitimacy for American institutions. Nonetheless, the planning and the crisis were interrelated, as Johnson tried not merely to appeal to young people but to devise programs to plan future generations. Whereas historians usually focus on how LBJ misread the lessons of history, this chapter suggests that an even deeper problem was how he misunderstood predictions about the future.

### From War Plans to Family Planning

The Johnson administration's penchant for long-range planning and cost-benefit analyses grew out of its struggle to reorient defense policy. Veterans of Robert McNamara's struggle to take control of the Pentagon would go on to lead the War on Poverty, and they applied their experience to this new arena. In essence it was a fight over how to plan for the future, with the answer hinging on whether projections, simulations, and scenarios trumped historical experience. Until then, the armed services had been able to undertake long-term commitments without having to offer long-term budgets. The small initial outlay for a weapons system was the "thin edge of the wedge," and once started it was difficult to stop. The Joint Chiefs were also committed to a nuclear war plan that called for an all-out attack on the Soviet Union and its allies. This led to an endless quest for new targets and new technologies to guarantee total destruction. McNamara and his staff found that preparation and training of US strategic forces had become

so routinized as to leave the president with little alternative but an all-out attack, since deviating from the plan would risk chaos.<sup>3</sup>

By the time Johnson assumed the presidency, McNamara appears to have all but given up on efforts to build more flexibility into US nuclear war plans.<sup>4</sup> But together with his advisors—many of them systems analysts from the RAND Corporation—he did beat back the Air Force’s demand that the United States procure forces capable of destroying the Soviet capacity to retaliate. Instead, force planning—and the budgets to match—was based on the likely Soviet threat five years hence and the minimum forces necessary to deliver “assured destruction” even if Moscow struck first. Projected Soviet capabilities, not preserving supremacy or state-of-the-art performance, was to be the driver in Pentagon research and development. The Program Planning and Budgeting System required the services to project the life-cycle costs of each new weapons system and show that, over the long run, it was the most efficient way to satisfy a specified requirement.<sup>5</sup>

In winning the fight over how to plan American forces McNamara and his advisors from RAND argued that they had to consider alternative futures that were so different from the past that history had become irrelevant. When one general seemed to belittle the “whiz kids,” McNamara’s deputy assistant secretary for systems analysis, Alain Enthoven, replied that “I have fought just as many nuclear wars as you have.” Instead, they ran computer simulations to calculate the point at which nuclear attacks would achieve diminishing returns and designed elaborate war games set in the future. They deemed this “ersatz experience” of World Wars III and IV, as RAND analyst Herman Kahn described it, more valuable than the experience of World Wars I and II. Moving directly into the E ring of the Pentagon from RAND’s campus in Santa Monica, celebrated by an admiring press as the avant-garde of things to come, this new generation of “defense intellectuals” had reason to feel confident.<sup>6</sup>

Back in Santa Monica, however, RAND was in crisis. The reasons were varied and complex, but the increasing animus of the Air Force caused the most anxiety. Until 1961, it provided more than 90 percent of RAND funding. That year Chief of Staff Curtis LeMay charged it with “strengthening the hand of the civilians” and demanded that it cease policy research. He also wanted RAND to stop accepting work from other sponsors, such as the Office of the Secretary of Defense. This made RAND’s leadership even more determined to find alternative sources of funding. It also emboldened those who had already been calling for new kinds of research. With deepening involvement in Vietnam and the prospect of more postcolonial conflicts,

this included analyses of the social and economic causes of insurgency. Ford Foundation funding also encouraged RAND researchers to begin to use systems analysis for nonmilitary applications, especially urban problems. As RAND historian David Jardini observes, with the beginning of Johnson's Great Society programs they realized that vastly increased domestic social welfare spending might also "contribute handsomely to social welfare in Santa Monica."<sup>7</sup>

In Washington too, senior figures were moving from the Pentagon to domestic policy. Among McNamara's top aides, Joseph Califano went to the White House to become LBJ's special assistant for domestic affairs, and Adam Yarmolinsky became deputy director of the Task Force on Poverty. Deputy assistant secretary of defense William Gorham went to Health, Education, and Welfare to head up a new planning and evaluation office. Another "Whiz Kid," Henry Rowen, became assistant director at the Bureau of the Budget, where he would develop DOD-style planning and programming for the rest of the government. These Pentagon veterans came to see national security and social welfare as "part of a continuum," as Rowen would say in 1968. This was especially the case once the CIA began to put black militants under surveillance and paratroopers were deployed to the cities to quell urban uprisings.<sup>8</sup>

Like McNamara's bureaucratic battle with the Pentagon, the great struggle within LBJ's Great Society would turn on the question of planning—who would do the planning, and for whom? In this case, it would pit those who believed that poor people had to participate in planning solutions to their problems against those—like Yarmolinsky and Rowen—who held that only professionals trained in systems analysis could design cost-effective programs. This was a struggle over time and position, with community activists and organizers insisting that they understood the local roots of poverty and could better respond to changing conditions, whereas their opponents asserted that they had a broader view and better understood the need for long-range planning.<sup>9</sup>

No issue would pose such questions in more acute and dramatic form than family planning. The stakes in these struggles were quite personal, even intimate: Should individuals be empowered to plan their own families, regardless of what those plans might be, or should officials instead devise programs to achieve specific population targets? Some of the first government-sponsored birth control clinics were organized in black communities at local initiative under the auspices of Community Action Programs. But the perception that the government set up clinics to reduce the fertility of black people would provoke a backlash.

Washington began to consider measures to reduce fertility after first confronting the challenges that came with rapid population growth, especially swelling numbers of young people. Much of the academic research and experimental projects that inspired Great Society programs originally focused on juvenile delinquency, a problem that came to be seen as global in scope. It was already a sensation during the Eisenhower years, when Hollywood portrayed gangs of youth seizing control of towns and terrorizing seniors. By 1963, when JFK delivered a special message to Congress on the subject, he noted that people under 20 already accounted for 40 percent of the US population. “This on-rushing tide of young persons has overcrowded our education system,” he noted, “from the grade schools to the high schools, and is now beginning to overflow our colleges, our graduate schools and the labor market.” Echoing the findings of Ford Foundation research and his own Committee on Juvenile Delinquency, JFK argued that young people were turning to crime because of a lack of opportunities. He called for improving schools and job training and the elimination of racial barriers and slum housing.<sup>10</sup>

Under LBJ, the United States would continue to grow rapidly and grow more youthful. By 1968, more than half the population was under 28 years of age. After the fertility rate peaked in 1957 at nearly four children per woman, one could at least begin to anticipate slower growth, though even lower fertility could mean a much larger population given the number of “baby boomers” entering their reproductive years. In poor countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, there was little indication that fertility rates were declining in the 1960s, and population growth was continuing to accelerate. The censuses held around the world in 1960 had exceeded projections, and it was feared that the next round in 1970 would once again show that experts had underestimated the challenge. What disconcerted demographers, one of them later recalled, “was not so much how high the projections were but how rapidly population growth was outstripping our ability to project it.”<sup>11</sup>

In poor countries even more than at home, the increasing number of jobless young people was thought to pose not merely an economic challenge, but a threat to social stability, especially in fast-growing cities. An influential World Bank-supported study—backed by Bank President Eugene Black in testimony before the UN Economic and Social Council—warned that countries with too-rapid population growth would be caught in a “low-level equilibrium trap.” According to this theory, supporting mere subsistence would leave nothing to invest for long-range development.<sup>12</sup> In 1960, thirty-nine Nobel Laureates declared that “unless a favorable balance of population

and resources is achieved with a minimum of delay, there is in prospect a Dark Age of human misery, famine, under-education and unrest which could generate growing panic, exploding into wars fought to appropriate the dwindling means of survival.”<sup>13</sup>

Over the course of the 1960s, the cause of population control began to garner support from more senior figures in the foreign policy establishment, such as Ellsworth Bunker, David Lilienthal, John J. McCloy, and Arthur Radford.<sup>14</sup> The main political challenge was to show that global population growth was a problem for the United States, not just poor countries, and that taxpayer support for “family planning” was an investment in the future. “The human family continues to grow at an unprecedented rate,” birth control pioneer Margaret Sanger warned in 1961, “multiplying and intensifying the tensions under which the world lives today.” “Hungry people affect our conscience. Hungry nations affect our future. Thus, the population explosion presents a global threat which transcends national boundaries, endangering the freedom of all mankind.”<sup>15</sup> In 1964, Harry Truman and Dwight Eisenhower agreed to become honorary co-chairmen of a Planned Parenthood fundraising campaign. Although it was focused on world population growth, most of the money actually went to support clinics in the United States. Even so, American donors still contributed the preponderant part of international family planning assistance. The American share would grow to more than 80 percent by 1968.<sup>16</sup>

Lyndon Johnson—like Kennedy before him—was initially reluctant even to discuss family planning, much less support public funding. JFK had warned during his campaign that “it would be the greatest psychological mistake for us to appear to advocate limitation of the black or brown or yellow people whose population is growing no faster than in the United States.”<sup>17</sup> The Catholic Church vigorously lobbied against any backsliding. As president, Kennedy made cautious references to the challenge of population growth, but thought it would be far better for private foundations and the United Nations to take the lead. After Johnson succeeded Kennedy, John D. Rockefeller 3rd, founder of the Population Council, repeatedly requested a meeting. In March 1965, he wrote that reducing population growth was “almost the controlling factor in the attainment of the Great Society for our own country and for the world.” But senior aide Jack Valenti advised that it was “still in my judgment not a matter that the President wants to visibly touch at this time.”<sup>18</sup>

That same month White House analyses of opinion polls showed that opposition was weakening. Four-fifths of respondents believed that birth control information should be available to anyone who wanted it, and

little difference remained between Catholics and Protestants.<sup>19</sup> Douglass Cater, special assistant to the president for health, education, and welfare, told him that “there is every evidence that even the Pope realizes that the times are changing,” alluding to the fact that a papal commission had convened to reconsider Church teaching.<sup>20</sup> The Director of the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization, B. R. Sen, warned that if the world did not boost output and limit population growth it would face a “disaster of an unprecedented magnitude” by the year 2000.<sup>21</sup> And at the end of the month the Supreme Court heard arguments in *Griswold v. Connecticut*, leading to the landmark ruling that overturned bans on birth control and established a constitutional right to privacy.

Johnson remained reluctant to assert leadership, even to settle disputes within his own administration. Several agencies were providing small grants for research in demography and reproductive health as well as supporting a few state programs that provided family planning. The Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) under Sargent Shriver was meant to be the headquarters of anti-poverty programs across the federal government. But Shriver was a Catholic and married to the late president’s sister. He insisted on issuing strict guidelines for OEO-funded programs. Henceforth, they could not assist unmarried women, pay more than twelve dollars a month for contraception, carry out sterilization, or even announce their services to the media. The Secretary for Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), Anthony Celebrezze, sharply protested, urging that the state welfare agencies be allowed to establish their own guidelines. Johnson declined to interfere.<sup>22</sup> OEO-supported Community Action Programs had already proven controversial, suspected of being run by “kooks and sociologists” (as Johnson put it). He may therefore have agreed that they should not be permitted to publicize support for family planning.<sup>23</sup>

Several of LBJ’s senior cabinet officers and close aides continued trying to convince him to take a more forthright stance, including Dean Rusk, McGeorge Bundy, Bill Moyers, and Robert Komer. But they made little headway. The US Agency for International Development (USAID) was even more reluctant to commit resources to support family planning abroad, allocating less than three million dollars in FY 1965.<sup>24</sup>

### Dollars and Cents Arguments

In April 1965, LBJ’s advisors finally discovered a way to overcome his caution. It was a study by a senior RAND economist named Stephen Enke



who was then consulting for USAID. Komer told Bundy that it was “a little flank attack that I think might just penetrate LBJ’s defenses. It’s a hard dollar and cents argument for taking a more serious view of birth control in the LDCs.” He wrote a memo for the president that began with “a fascinating statistic.” Money allocated to reducing population growth rather than accelerating production in developing countries was “*100 times more effective in raising output per capita!*” The figures were “just one good economist’s,” Komer conceded. “However, even if they’re off somewhat, there’s no doubt of the rapidly declining cost of population control because of new devices” (i.e., the plastic intra-uterine device (IUD) developed by Rockefeller’s Population Council). This could have “immense significance” for India, Pakistan, and other recipients of US aid, Komer concluded. “The process of getting these countries to the stage of self-sustaining growth, *and thus reducing the longer term foreign aid burden on us*—could be greatly foreshortened.”<sup>25</sup>

Enke’s study was like a lot of other RAND cost-benefit analyses, the kind that had shown missiles to be more cost-effective than bombers in attacking Soviet targets. It was, however, among the first to be applied to the “life-cycle” of human beings and the rather more complicated question of how to increase welfare. This required Enke to make several debatable assumptions. He equated welfare with per-capita GNP, even though parents who elect to have children may think it increases welfare in other ways. He also stipulated that new workers in an “overpopulated” country produced diminishing returns. While he conceded that investing in health and education might yield high returns in productivity, he assumed poor countries would not make good investments in human capital.<sup>26</sup>

The most critical assumption in Enke’s analysis was that one could apply the economic concept of discounting to public policy and discount the present value of future citizens. For an individual or a firm, discounting future gains or losses makes sense: a gain is worth more if it comes sooner rather than later, and a loss seems less as long as it is deferred. But Enke urged governments of poor countries to engage in a cost-benefit analysis in deciding whether to discourage couples from having children. He argued that the present value of goods a child in a poor country would consume—including subsistence, education, and healthcare—was worth far more than what they would produce as adults. If society prevented their birth, it would realize a gain of \$279. At the same time, it would reduce by one the number of people who would have to share the wealth.<sup>27</sup>

The concept of the “prevented birth” would prove crucial in cost-benefit analyses of population control. “It has all the abstract purity of a mathematical

symbol,” one Ford Foundation official enthused. World Bank economists were initially intrigued, but then realized that “calculations of the benefits of a prevented birth lead logically to the extermination of the human race.” Komer seems not to have noticed this problem. He was instead enthusiastic about Enke’s idea that a four-dollar vasectomy could have the same impact on per capita GNP as one thousand dollars invested in the economy. If people did not see that reducing their fertility was in their own best interest, Enke also advised that governments should pay them incentives: \$325 for sterilization, or \$30 a year for using an IUD (\$2,500 and \$231 in today’s dollars).<sup>28</sup>

Komer did not tell the president that the study favored paying people to stop having children. Instead, he focused on how the United States could use incentives to shape the reproductive behavior of whole nations, that is, “using our foreign aid more as an incentive to major efforts in this field by the less developed countries themselves.”<sup>29</sup> India was then requesting additional food aid to avert a threatened famine. Johnson reduced these shipments to a month’s supply and then began yanking what his aides called the “short leash” to compel concessions.<sup>30</sup> The administration insisted that India develop a long-range plan to meet specified numerical targets in numbers of sterilizations performed and IUDs inserted. American consultants advised that meeting targets would require paying incentives both to providers and those who agreed to the procedures. The Indian Ministry of Health resisted these arguments and refused to set targets or pay incentives.<sup>31</sup>

To avoid protest against US pressure, these negotiations were conducted quietly, mainly under the auspices of the World Bank. But in June 1965, at the twentieth anniversary celebration of the United Nations in San Francisco, Johnson publicly announced the principle upon which they were based:

Let us in all our lands—including this land—face forthrightly the multiplying problems of our multiplying populations and seek the answers to this most profound challenge to the future of all the world. Let us act on the fact that less than five dollars invested in population control is worth a hundred dollars invested in economic growth.<sup>32</sup>

Enke’s equation only applied to an “overpopulated” country, where there was supposedly no increase in innovation and additional labor only brought diminishing returns. LBJ was now suggesting that population control might be more efficient in stimulating economic growth at home as well.

Family planning advocates had long insisted that the United States would not be able to persuade other countries to accept that they had population problems unless it accepted that Americans needed family planning too.

Johnson was told that if fertility rates did not decline the country was on course to have 400 million people by the year 2000.<sup>33</sup> He may well have had a more particular concern when he referred to “the multiplying problems of our multiplying populations.” This was the month he first referred to the number of African American children born out of wedlock in a commencement address at Howard University.<sup>34</sup> It was based on a Labor Department report by Daniel Patrick Moynihan, which pointed to the “extraordinary growth in Negro population,” then increasing at twice the rate of white Americans. Although Moynihan blamed the legacy of racism, he argued that African Americans exhibited a “tangle of pathology,” citing higher rates of delinquency, addiction, and below-average intelligence.<sup>35</sup>

LBJ probably did not think through the implications of invoking the cost-benefit rationale for population control. But what Komer called a “flank attack” had exposed a vulnerable salient in Johnson’s War on Poverty. If poor people were caught in a “cycle of poverty,” and the problem was literally reproducing itself and growing with every generation, how could piecemeal attacks on health, education, job training, and so on possibly make a difference? Moynihan himself did not call for targeting fertility, but rather redoubling anti-poverty programs and making direct payments to families. But many others concluded that the root cause of poverty was cultural, and perhaps even biological, and that government handouts were breeding dependency.<sup>36</sup>

That summer, riots in Watts and the rise of the Black Power movement deepened divisions among white liberals. Johnson himself was shaken and worried that it would undermine support for his vision of a Great Society. Rather than rural communities in Appalachia—the focus of his administration’s public relations effort—the new face of poverty was a young African American chanting “burn baby burn.” This went against the whole premise of Community Action Programs—that poor people needed to be empowered to help themselves. Even before the events in Watts, the mayor of Los Angeles had sponsored a resolution before the annual conference of mayors accusing the OEO of “fostering class warfare.”<sup>37</sup>

For three days and nights during the August rioting in Watts Johnson stayed at his Texas ranch and refused to return phone calls.<sup>38</sup> When he roused himself, LBJ decided to rush money to Los Angeles and rebuild Watts, even at the risk of appearing to reward rioters. Privately he explained that cities were on the verge of exploding, filled as they were with hopeless people from “broken homes and illegitimate families.”<sup>39</sup>

A week after the fires died down, Johnson announced a more far-reaching strategy. Charles Schultze and Henry Rowen at the Bureau of the Budget

were told to begin applying Pentagon-style planning and cost-benefit analyses to the rest of the executive branch. It would help LBJ to centralize control of his domestic agenda, including controversial items like the Community Action Programs. At the same time, the president could claim that he was tracking every dollar and ensuring not a penny was wasted.<sup>40</sup> Henceforth, departments would have to develop five-year plans and justify their programs to the Bureau of the Budget with cost-benefit analyses.

When he went public with the new approach, Johnson described it as “revolutionary,” suggesting that it would make domestic policymaking “as up-to-date, I think, as our space exploring program.” It would also save money: “Everything I have done,” he said, “in both legislation and the construction of a budget has been guided by my deep concern for the American people—consistent with wise management of the taxpayer’s dollar.” The new approach would guarantee they could “control our programs and our budgets rather than having them control us.”<sup>41</sup>

At the same time, Johnson established a task force on family planning, one that would immediately focus on unwed mothers. The issue was so sensitive that the officials at HEW who worked on the issue called themselves the “Never-Never Committee.”<sup>42</sup> While Moynihan was effectively banished, White House staff continued to read and discuss his research. One article Califano circulated noted that America’s nonwhite population was mounting inexorably, from 1 in 10 in 1960 to 1 in 8 by the end of the decade and already accounted for nearly 17 percent of newborns. For Moynihan, the fact that the government provided payments for children in broken homes was “a form of social insanity.”<sup>43</sup>

Even were it not for the special concern about unwed mothers, family planning was bound to be a major beneficiary of the new approach to planning and justifying government expenditures. As Enke’s calculations had shown, “births prevented” could be immediately quantified, unlike many other measures of welfare, such as long-term reductions in crime or increases in income. The authors of one of the first Planning, Programming, and Budgeting studies for the department of HEW compared the cost-effectiveness of \$10 million for family planning with \$10 million for comprehensive health care for mothers and infants. If one assumed that providing 500,000 poor women with contraception would prevent 49,000 births annually—a very debatable assumption, as it turned out—that would also mean about 2,000 fewer infant deaths and 1,000 fewer mentally handicapped children. The same \$10 million would cover comprehensive health care for just 6,880 poor mothers and 34,400 infants. This option would reduce the number of deaths by between 84 and 119, and also reduce the

number who were mentally handicapped by between 7 and 14. According to this comparison, preventing births would appear to be a much more efficient way to reduce mortality and the incidence of intellectual disability. If one also included the cost of caring for and educating children and did not calculate their future contributions, preventing births would indeed appear to be the single most effective way to fight poverty. But this was only because it promised to reduce the number of poor people, calculations that could just as easily extend to the entire human race, as the World Bank economists had noted. By itself, preventing births did not reduce extraordinarily high rates of infant mortality (41 in 1,000) and mental disability (21 in 1,000) in this vulnerable population.<sup>44</sup>

In the wake of the Watts riots, officials concluded that they had to restore public confidence by showing measurable progress in the War on Poverty. Results so far were mixed and, as Moynihan pointed out, they were taking on a much greater challenge: from an “original concern to improve the physical equipment of cities toward an effort to improve the human beings who live in them.” They had already tried all the high payoff measures, such as universal education and improved sanitation. Family planning was “the one great exception.” Douglas Cater assured Johnson that OEO researchers had concluded that family planning was “the most effective anti-poverty program currently available.”<sup>45</sup>

Johnson continued pressing to expand federal support for family planning, but he had to contend with Catholic opposition. HEW insisted to the Bishops that it would not impose these programs where state or local authorities did not want them or force people to participate.<sup>46</sup> It was easier for Johnson to act abroad, especially where he had leverage and could act quietly, such as rationing food aid for India. In December 1965, after being told that famine was inevitable, he agreed to release another three-month supply of wheat. He told the Indian agriculture minister, Chidambaram Subramaniam, that Americans were “not interested in disciplining anyone, in becoming the masters of anyone, or in dominating anyone.” The United States had its own problems, he admitted. But he wanted to achieve new results in food and population both at home and abroad: “We would exercise whatever persuasion we could toward these ends. We wanted to provide incentives too.”<sup>47</sup>

## Backlash

When Indira Gandhi became prime minister in January 1966, it was thought that Delhi would agree to a more forceful population control

program. She supported paying people who agreed to have an IUD inserted, as did India's Finance Ministry and Planning Commission. A joint Ford Foundation-Planning Commission study agreed that every "birth averted" was a "saving to the nation."<sup>48</sup> But when Califano suggested the United States give more food aid as a good will gesture before Gandhi came to Washington "Johnson exploded all over my memo." "No, *Hell* no." Califano got a call that afternoon and, before he could even say "Yes, Mr. President," Johnson yelled, "Are you out of your fucking mind?" He would not agree to further food shipments until Gandhi presented a comprehensive plan to reduce fertility: "I'm not going to piss away foreign aid in nations where they refuse to deal with their own population problems."<sup>49</sup>

A more effective population control program was only one of a number of things that Washington and the World Bank wanted from India, but it was an essential part of any new aid package. In calling for "a massive effort to *control population growth*," Rusk noted that "*she* knows and *we* know that without tangible and continuing American interest in the future of the Indian Union, that Union does not have much of a future."<sup>50</sup> After Gandhi returned to Delhi, the Planning Commission directed the newly designated Ministry of Health and Family Planning to begin paying both providers and "acceptors." According to a new five-year plan, 4.5 million would be sterilized and 19 million women would be using IUDs, with mobile vans and camps reaching areas that did not have health clinics. As in Johnson's War on Poverty, states were directed to focus on densely populated areas. Officials likened the family planning campaign to a military operation: unplanned births represented "the enemy within the gate," Minister of Planning Asoka Mehta argued. "It is war that we have to wage, and, as in all wars, we can not be choosy, some will get hurt, something will go wrong. What is needed is the will to wage the war so as to win it."<sup>51</sup>

Alas, paid to perform as many procedures as quickly as possible, providers cut corners and left their patients to cope with complications. Even with trained staff, proper screening, and sterile inserters, IUD insertions can cause prolonged bleeding and pelvic inflammatory disease. They can also lead to ectopic pregnancies or septic abortions. In the case of India, conditions were often poor, and once the mobile teams moved on there was no one to treat side effects or even remove the devices. After 1966 there was a sharp decline in the number of women willing to use an IUD. Instead, the family planning program began to rely on sterilization. The areas with the most rapid increase in tubectomies and vasectomies were also those areas stricken by famine. Subsequently, it was determined that many of those who agreed to sterilization in exchange for money or food would not have been

likely to have had any more children. Investigators found that in one area almost half were over 50 years old. Some women had IUDs inserted for cash and then removed them, going back for another insertion—and another payment—repeatedly.<sup>52</sup>

The “targets” of population control programs understood that a “prevented birth” is not necessarily a savings, either for the couple—who without sons lack security in old age—or for the country. Economists had begun to realize that there was almost no correlation between population growth and per capita income. In fact, population increase could be an engine of economic growth by leading to greater innovation and efficiency in land use.<sup>53</sup>

Nevertheless, population control proponents wanted to make the Indian precedent into a policy. The 1966 Food for Peace bill required that the president take into account whether countries were controlling their population growth before agreeing to concessionary grain sales.<sup>54</sup> There was also a push to match this foreign policy with a more determined domestic program. In a statement circulated to all embassies as representing the administration position, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs Robert W. Barnett said that this program could focus on “our congested urban complexes, in the Trust territories, in the Indian reservations.” Rowen testified before Congress that the problem of African American family and culture was comparable to problems of development in poor countries. “Both in sections of the ‘third world’ and in the Negro community, there is a self-sustaining negative cycle which preserves elements which are strongly resistant to modernization or social developments.”<sup>55</sup> In both cases, many concluded, it was necessary to short-circuit the “cycle of poverty” (i.e., at the moment of conception).

In his public statements, Johnson took care to insist that birth control would have to be accepted voluntarily, both at home and abroad. He considered it a matter of right. “Why should a woman with money be able to control her family size,” he asked, “while a poor woman has got nowhere to go?”<sup>56</sup> But Pentagon-style planning and a focus on “prevented births” led to abuse in the United States as well. When the Department of Defense shifted from bombers to missiles, after all it was merely choosing different means to the same end: deterring or defeating the USSR. A “War on Poverty” represented a very different kind of problem. The causes of poverty were many and complex, local and even personal, including the poor choices that some people insisted on making—not just poor people but also those who excluded them from employment, education, and housing. Even if there was a Department of HEW, health, education, and welfare did not constitute a closed system that could be managed from Washington.



Where local circumstances did approximate a closed system—or appeared that way to doctors and officials—the cost-benefit calculus could have terrible consequences. In city hospitals, the rural South, and Indian reservations, some doctors on the government payroll began to focus on those they deemed irresponsible. They warned women on welfare that they would lose their benefits if they did not agree to sterilization. Some OEO-funded programs circumvented guidelines proscribing the procedure. There was a dramatic increase in “elective hysterectomies” in city hospitals, and over the following decade investigators found that on reservations a quarter to a half of women aged 18–44 had been sterilized. The General Accounting Office reported that doctors had consistently failed to obtain informed consent, and it became common to ask women in the midst of delivering a baby if they also wanted a tubal ligation. Studies of physician attitudes found that many believed they were helping society by reducing the welfare burden. Dwight Eisenhower himself argued in 1965 that family planning would have to be tied to welfare, or “history will rightly condemn us.” It was folly for the government to be “spending money with one hand to slow up population growth among responsible families and with the other providing financial incentives for increasing production by the ignorant, feeble-minded or lazy.”<sup>57</sup>

Here again, local practices reflected attitudes at the top, even if senior officials did not announce it as a policy. When Rockefeller called for a presidential commission on population, one that would take up the “relationship of mounting welfare rolls to family planning and population stabilization,” Budget Director Schultze thought outsiders could advocate making contraception available to “all appropriate welfare recipients” without risking the “political booby traps” of an official commission. That year, the House version of the 1967 Social Security bill prohibited increased federal assistance to states in which children on welfare made up a growing proportion of the population. This provision was dropped in conference, but the final version required that welfare case workers tell AFDC recipients that birth control was available free of charge.<sup>58</sup>

HEW policy specified that eligibility for benefits should not be made contingent on accepting family planning. But the message heard in many poor communities was that the government wanted them to stop having children. African American leaders in Pittsburgh forced the OEO to shut down its family planning program, citing tactics that had been tested abroad and were now being tried in US communities. “What U.S. hospital has a policy of visiting sick people who skip appointments?” asked a local NAACP official. “What welfare group sends volunteers to the homes of people who



miss getting their check or the chance to get welfare food supplies? Do they have 'volunteers' to go out and tell people about good jobs?"<sup>59</sup>

By the end of 1967, many population control proponents worried that even these measures would not work. As the prominent demographer Kingsley Davis argued, what made family planning politically acceptable was what made it practically ineffective. "By stressing the right of parents to have the number of children they want, it evades the basic question of population policy, which is how to give societies the number of children they need."<sup>60</sup> Many senior figures in the field began to think it might be necessary to go "beyond family planning," including the calculated use of incentives and disincentives, not just in poor countries like India, but at home as well. But most concluded that they should instead continue expanding family planning programs to determine whether more voluntary methods might work. Together with allies in Congress, they succeeded in having an increasing portion of the budget earmarked for population programs, even while USAID spending on health and OEO anti-poverty programs were cut back.<sup>61</sup>

Johnson did little to defend the Office of Equal Opportunity while it was in danger of total elimination. In his 1968 State of the Union message, he hardly mentioned efforts to alleviate poverty, which had been the centerpiece of his inaugural address four years earlier.<sup>62</sup> Increasingly, he talked about family planning as the solution. In July 1968 Johnson finally agreed to establish a "President's Committee on Population and Family Planning," letting it be known that he did "not think the Government is doing enough or doing it effectively enough." He also demanded from his staff "*immediate*" answers to new questions about population and the future, such as "What will the Negro population be in 1976; what increase is that over today?"<sup>63</sup>

A week later, Paul VI released the encyclical *Humanae Vitae*. A majority of his commission had recommended accepting birth control, but the Pope overruled them. A Polish cardinal named Karol Józef Wojtyła, the future John Paul II, apparently convinced him that changing policy would undermine papal authority. But in the encyclical the Pope also argued that accepting that contraception was a legitimate solution for the problems of individual couples would make it an acceptable instrument of social policy: "Who will stop rulers from favoring, from even imposing upon their peoples, if they were to consider it necessary, the method of contraception which they judge to be most efficacious?"<sup>64</sup>

With *Humanae Vitae*, the backlash against population control had well and truly begun, a backlash that continues to this day. It was usually inspired by religious faith or a mistrust of any effort to give women more autonomy.

But it was also incited by the excesses of population-control propaganda, which went to new extremes in 1968. That year Paul Ehrlich published *The Population Bomb*, which cited projections of demographic growth to predict that hundreds of millions of people would die in global famines during the 1970s. He argued that the United States had no choice but to use food aid to compel other countries to control fertility. It was also the year when the Club of Rome first convened under the leadership of an Italian industrialist, Aurelio Peccei. The report it issued on *The Limits to Growth* in 1972 would also become a bestseller. Building from a systems analysis model of a city, the authors applied this method to the entire world, predicting that population growth and pollution would lead to “overshoot and collapse.” Unlike Ehrlich, they did not explicitly call for population control. Privately Peccei speculated that “it would be best if India were freed from people . . . so that other people (white?) could take over. To his mind, accumulated DDT in Indians would be a great solution.”<sup>65</sup>

In the 1970s, there was also a backlash against systems analysis and other forms of expert planning in social welfare, which too often appeared to conceal hidden agendas.<sup>66</sup> But international development institutions continued using population projections—and the projected savings from “births averted”—to justify “demand creation” programs. In most countries this mainly consisted of marketing contraception and promoting the small family norm, but in many others—including Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Singapore, and South Korea—population control could mean limiting access to schools, clinics, and public housing.<sup>67</sup> Systems analysis like that used by the Club of Rome persuaded the leaders of Communist China that they must limit couples to just one child to prevent the population from growing to more than four billion by 2080.<sup>68</sup>

RAND became an important center for urban policy and population research, and many other think tanks imitated their methods. Senior officials continued to rotate between the Defense Department and the “War on Poverty.” Yarmolinsky went back to the Pentagon, joined by Stephen Enke as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Economics. Under Richard Nixon, three future Defense Secretaries served in the OEO: Donald Rumsfeld, Dick Cheney, and Frank Carlucci. Robert McNamara became president of the World Bank, where he made population control a top priority. Despite the skepticism of Bank economists, countries were told that “births averted” would measurably reduce costs in education and that population control was a condition for structural adjustment loans. On the other hand, McNamara said he was reluctant to finance health care “unless it was very strictly related to population control, because usually health facilities

contributed to the decline of the death rate, and thereby to the population explosion.”<sup>69</sup>

Decades after the end of the Johnson administration, people working for reproductive rights and health still struggle to shake off the legacies of this period, when family planning became a means to plan other people’s families, and health, welfare, and rights were sacrificed for the sake of “population control.” Ironically, and tragically, fertility rates were already falling before these more coercive and manipulative measures were tried, in poorer parts of the United States as well as in China, in countries that subsidized contraception as well as those that discouraged it. The consequences of these needless social engineering experiments go beyond the damage done to the cause of reproductive rights. They created an abiding skepticism of the very idea that governments should try to plan progress. Whereas in 1967 an observer as astute as the sociologist Daniel Bell predicted that “with our increasing ‘future orientation’, government will necessarily have to do more and more planning,” Ronald Reagan convinced the country that government was the problem, not the solution. While Bell thought that “the entire complex of social prestige and social status” would reside in the intellectual and scientific communities that planned the future, mistrust and even contempt for intellectuals has become one of the hallmarks of a society that is still not as great as it could be.<sup>70</sup>

## NOTES

1. “Special Message to the Congress on Conservation: ‘To Renew a Nation,’” March 8, 1968, and “Remarks at the University of Michigan,” May 22, 1964, both in John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, *The American Presidency Project*, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws>.

2. Dan T. Carter, *The Politics of Rage: George Wallace, the Origins of the New Conservatism, and the Transformation of American Politics*, 2d ed. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2000), 253.

3. Stephen B. Johnson, “From Concurrency to Phased Planning: An Episode in the History of Systems Management,” in *Systems, Experts, and Computers: The Systems Approach in Management and Engineering, World War II and After*, ed. Agatha C. Hughes and Thomas P. Hughes (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2000), 93–112; Fred Kaplan, *The Wizards of Armageddon* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1991), 251–257.

4. Francis J. Gavin, “The Myth of Flexible Response: United States Strategy in Europe during the 1960s,” *International History Review* 23 (December 2001): 847–875.

5. On the “McNamara Revolution,” see Kaplan, *Wizards of Armageddon*, as well as the excellent dissertation by David Raymond Jardini, “Out of the Blue Yonder: The RAND Corporation’s Diversification into Social Welfare Research, 1946–1968” (Carnegie Mellon University, 1996), 209–231. For good examples of how McNamara used future scenarios to overcome Air Force opposition to his procurement plans, see Joint Chiefs of Staff to McNamara, August 31, 1962, RG 200, Records of Robert S. McNamara, Defense Programs and Operations, box 28, and McNamara to Kennedy, November 21, 1962, RG 200, Records of Robert S. McNamara, Defense Programs and Operations, box 25, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland (hereinafter NARA).

6. Kaplan, *The Wizards of Armageddon*, 254; Sharon Ghamari-Tabrizi, *The Worlds of Herman Kahn: The Intuitive Science of Thermonuclear War*, 1st ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2005), 56–59, 124–125.

7. Jardini, “Out of the Blue Yonder,” 235–237, 289.

8. Jennifer S. Light, *From Warfare to Welfare: Defense Intellectuals and Urban Problems in Cold War America* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), 168–169.

9. Jardini, “Out of the Blue Yonder,” 329–334.

10. “Special Message to the Congress on the Nation’s Youth,” February 14, 1963, Woolley and Peters, *The American Presidency Project*, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws>; Jardini, “Out of the Blue Yonder,” 313–316.

11. John Caldwell and Pat Caldwell, *Limiting Population Growth and the Ford Foundation Contribution* (London: Frances Pinter, 1986), 23.

12. A. J. Coale and E. M. Hoover, *Population Growth and Economic Development in Low Income Countries* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1958). On Black speech, see FO 371/161053, National Archives, Kew, United Kingdom.

13. “Birth Control Urged,” *New York Times*, November 18, 1960.

14. “An Appeal to President John F. Kennedy,” *New York Times*, August 27, 1961.

15. “The World Population Emergency Campaign Reports on the Population Explosion . . . The Problem of Our Time,” November 1961, series B, reel 715, frames 1069–1079, International Planned Parenthood Federation Archives (hereinafter IPPFA), Regent Park, London.

16. Phyllis Tilson Piotrow, *World Population Crisis: The United States Response* (New York: Praeger, 1973), 88; “Projected Allocations for 1964,” IPPFA, series B, reel 715, frame 1760.

17. Piotrow, *World Population Crisis*, 44.

18. *Ibid.*, 73–75; Bundy to Valenti, March 7, 1965, and Valenti to Johnson, March 9, 1965, LBJ Papers, Welfare, EX WE 11/22/1963, box 1, Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library, Austin, Texas (hereinafter LBJL).

19. “Summaries of Recent Polls,” April 7, 1965, LBJ Papers, National Security File, Robert W. Komer, box 48, LBJL.

20. Cater to Johnson, March 30, 1965, LBJ Papers, Files of S. Douglass Cater, box 66, LBJL.

21. "Statement by Dr. B. R. Sen," RG 8, B. R. Sen, file 110, Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome.
22. Cater to Johnson, March 30, 1965, and "Special Conditions Applicable to the Use of OEO Grant Funds," both in LBJ Papers, Files of S. Douglass Cater, box 66, LBJL.
23. Jardini, "Out of the Blue Yonder," 337–338.
24. Piotrow, *World Population Crisis*, 92–96.
25. Komer to Bundy, April 27, 1965, and Enke, "Lower Birth Rates—Some Economic Aspects," February 12, 1965, LBJ Papers, National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer, box 48, Population Control 1965–March 1966, LBJL (emphasis in original). For more on the Enke study and its impact, see Matthew Connelly, *Fatal Misconception: The Struggle to Control World Population* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2008), 207–213.
26. Enke, "Lower Birth Rates—Some Economic Aspects."
27. Regarding discounting, see Warren C. Robinson and David E. Horlacher, "Evaluating the Economic Benefits of Fertility Reduction," *Studies in Family Planning* 1, no. 39 (1969): 4–8.
28. Lyle Saunders, "Research and Evaluation: Needs for the Future," report number 000461, Ford Foundation Archives, New York, N.Y.; Cassen to King, January 14, 1970, Central Files 1969–1971, IBRD—IDA Administration, Liaison and Policy Files, box 145, "Population-1969-III," World Bank Group Archives (hereinafter WBGA); Enke, "Lower Birth Rates—Some Economic Aspects."
29. Komer to LBJ, April 27, 1965, *FRUS 1964–1968*, vol. IX, 95–96.
30. H. W. Brands, *The Wages of Globalism: Lyndon Johnson and the Limits of American Power* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 133–134; Paul Y. Hammond, *LBJ and the Presidential Management of Foreign Relations* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1992), 74.
31. Connelly, *Fatal Misconception*, 213–222.
32. "Address in San Francisco," June 25, 1965, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson*, 1965, vol. 2 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1966), 705.
33. Horace Busby to LBJ, March 3, 1965, LBJ Papers, Welfare (EX WE 11/22/1963), box 1, LBJL.
34. "Commencement Address at Howard University: 'To Fulfill These Rights'," June 4, 1965, Woolley and Peters, *The American Presidency Project*, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws>.
35. "The Negro Family: The Case for National Action," March 1965, <http://www.dol.gov/oasam/programs/history/webid-meynihan.htm>.
36. Godfrey Hodgson, *The Gentleman from New York: Daniel Patrick Moynihan* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2000), 113–119.
37. William C. Selover, "The View from Capitol Hill: Harassment and Survival," in *On Fighting Poverty: Perspectives from Experience*, ed. James L. Sundquist (New York: Basic Books, 1969), 181; Randall B. Woods, *LBJ: Architect of American Ambition* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2007), 589–591.

38. Joseph A. Califano, *Inside: A Public and Private Life* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), 156.

39. Woods, *LBJ*, 591–592.

40. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, *Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding* (New York: Macmillan, 1969), 144; Jardini, “Out of the Blue Yonder,” 339–341.

41. “The President’s News Conference of August 25, 1965,” and “Statement by the President to Cabinet Members,” August 25, 1965, Woolley and Peters, *The American Presidency Project*, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws>.

42. Donald Critchlow, *Intended Consequences: Birth Control, Abortion, and the Federal Government in Modern America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 75.

43. Califano to Bundy et al., September 27, 1965, LBJ Papers, Welfare (EX WE 11/22/1963), box 1, LBJL; Daniel Patrick Moynihan, “A Family Policy for the Nation,” *America* 113 (September 18, 1965): 280–283.

44. Elizabeth B. Drew, “HEW Grapples with PPBS,” *Public Interest*, no. 8 (summer 1967): 9.

45. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, “A Crisis of Confidence?” *Public Interest*, no. 7 (Spring 1967): 6; Critchlow, *Intended Consequences*, 77.

46. McPherson to Moyers, January 28, 1966, LBJ Papers, Welfare (EX WE 11/22/1963), box 1, LBJL.

47. Freeman to Johnson, November 26, 1965, Komer to Johnson, December 6, 1965, and LBJ–Subramaniam, memcon, December 20, 1965, all in *FRUS, South Asia, 1964–1968*, vol. XXV, 476–479, 484–486, and 516–518.

48. Berelson memo to files, September 14, 1964, RG IV3B4.5, Rockefeller Archive Center, Tarrytown, N.Y.; “Evaluation of the Family Planning Programme, Reports of Assessment Teams and the Panel of Consultants,” June 25, 1965, National Institute of Health and Family Welfare, Documentation Centre, New Delhi, Depository, 06/213.8/IND.

49. Joseph A. Califano, *The Triumph and Tragedy of Lyndon Johnson: The White House Years* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2000), 154–155; Califano, *Inside*, 172–173 (emphasis in original).

50. Rusk to LBJ, March 26, 1966, LBJ Papers, National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer, box 133, Prime Minister Gandhi Visit Papers (emphasis in original), LBJL.

51. Mitra to B. Mukherjee, October 22, 1965, Asok Mitra Papers, National Planning Commission, box 152; Mukherjee to State Health Ministers, November 10, 1965, idem, box 152, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, Delhi; “The Problem—Some Broad Conclusions,” n.d., but ca. April 1965, S[eries]-0175-[box] 0627-06, Family Planning—India (210-1A), United Nations Archives and Records Centre, New York.

52. Connelly, *Fatal Misconception*, 222–227.

53. Richard A. Easterlin, “Effects of Population Growth on Economic Development,” *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*

369 (1967): 98–108; Ester Boserup, *The Conditions of Agricultural Growth: The Economics of Agrarian Change under Population Pressure* (Chicago: 1967); Simon Kuznets, “Population and Economic Growth,” *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 111 (1967): 170–193.

54. “Statement of the President upon Signing the Food for Peace Act of 1966,” November 12, 1966, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966*, vol. 2, 608; Piotrow, *World Population Crisis*, 117, 127.

55. Robert W. Barnett, “Population: Policy and Program,” March 25, 1966, USNA, RG 59, Central Files, 1964–1966, Soc 13-3, box 3200; Jardini, “Out of the Blue Yonder,” 358.

56. Piotrow, *World Population Crisis*, 91.

57. Robert E. McGarrah, “Voluntary Female Sterilization: Abuses, Risks and Guidelines,” *Hastings Center Report* 4, no. 3 (June 1974): 5–6; Jane Lawrence, “The Indian Health Service and the Sterilization of Native American Women,” *American Indian Quarterly* 24, no. 3 (2000): 409–412; Thomas B. Littlewood, *The Politics of Population Control* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977), 107–111; Jael Silliman et al., *Undivided Rights: Women of Color Organize for Reproductive Justice* (Cambridge, Mass.: South End Press, 2004), 111–112; Nancy Ordovery, *American Eugenics: Race, Queer Anatomy, and the Science of Nationalism* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003), 165–170.

58. Charles Schultze to Califano, June 10, 1967, LBJ Papers, Welfare, EX WE 2/16/1967, box 2, LBJL; Piotrow, *World Population Crisis*, 141; Critchlow, *Intended Consequences*, 89–93, 109–111.

59. Gardner to Heads of Operating Agencies, January 31, 1968, LBJ Papers, Files of S. Douglass Cater, box 66, LBJL; J. Mayone Stycos, “Opinion, Ideology, and Population Problems: Some Sources of Domestic and Foreign Opposition to Birth Control,” in National Academy of Sciences Office of the Foreign Secretary, *Rapid Population Growth: Consequences and Policy Implications* (Baltimore: NAS, 1971), 553, 555–556.

60. Kingsley Davis, “Population Policy: Will Current Programs Succeed?” *Science* 158 (November 10, 1967): 730–739.

61. Bernard Berelson, “Beyond Family Planning,” *Studies in Family Planning* 1, no. 38 (1969): 1–16; Piotrow, *World Population Crisis*, 132–142.

62. Selover, “The View from Capitol Hill,” 179–180.

63. “Excerpts—News Briefing,” July 16, 1968, and untitled memo, July 23, 1968, both in LBJ Papers, Files of S. Douglass Cater, box 66, LBJL.

64. *Humanae Vitae*, July 25, 1968, [http://www.vatican.va/holy\\_father/paul\\_vi/encyclicals](http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/paul_vi/encyclicals); Robert McClory, *Turning Point* (New York: Crossroad, 1995), 130–132; Peter Hebblethwaite, *Paul VI: The First Modern Pope* (New York: Paulist Press, 1993), 472.

65. Paul Ehrlich, *The Population Bomb* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1968); Donella Meadows et al., *The Limits to Growth: A Report for the Club of Rome’s Project on the Predicament of Mankind* (New York: Universe Books, 1972). On



Peccei, see Jenny Andersson, "Choosing Futures: Alva Myrdal and the Construction of Swedish Futures Studies, 1967–1972," *International Review of Social History* 51, no. 2 (2006): 284.

66. For an early salvo, see Ida R. Hoos, *Systems Analysis in Public Policy: A Critique* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), 173–193.

67. Connelly, *Fatal Misconception*, 348–350.

68. Susan Greenhalgh, "Science, Modernity, and the Making of China's One-Child Policy," *Population and Development Review* 29 (2003): 170–178; Greenhalgh, "Missile Science, Population Science: The Origins of China's One-Child Policy," *China Quarterly* 182 (June 2005): 263.

69. On debates in the Bank, see Central Files 1947–1968, General Files—Projects and Studies, box 35, "Population," vol. 3, WBGA. For McNamara, see President's Council Meeting, March 3, 1969, 3–4, Office of the President, Records of President McNamara, series 2, President's Council Minutes, box 1, WBGA. On the Bank's methods of persuading countries to adopt population control, see Fred T. Sai and Lauren A. Chester, "The Role of the Bank in Shaping Third World Population Policy," in *Population Policy: Contemporary Issues*, ed. Godfrey Roberts (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1990), 182–190.

70. Daniel Bell, "Notes on the Post-Industrial Society," *Public Interest*, no. 6 (Winter 1967): 30, 35.