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**Matthew Connelly**

## RETHINKING THE COLD WAR AND DECOLONIZATION: THE GRAND STRATEGY OF THE ALGERIAN WAR FOR INDEPENDENCE

October and November 1960 were two of the coldest months of the Cold War. Continuing tensions over Berlin and the nuclear balance were exacerbated by crises in Laos, Congo, and—for the first time—France’s rebellious *départements* in Algeria. During Nikita Khrushchev’s table-pounding visit to the United Nations, he embraced Belkacem Krim, the foreign minister of the *Gouvernement Provisoire de la République Algérienne* (GPRA). After mugging for the cameras at the Soviet estate in Glen Cove, New York, Khrushchev confirmed that this constituted *de facto* recognition of the provisional government and pledged all possible aid. Meanwhile, in Beijing, President Ferhat Abbas delivered the GPRA’s first formal request for Chinese “volunteers.” U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower asked his National Security Council “whether such intervention would not mean war.” The council agreed that if communist regulars infiltrated Algeria, the United States would be bound by the North Atlantic Treaty to come to the aid of French President Charles de Gaulle and his beleaguered government. After six years of insurgency, Algeria appeared to be on the brink of becoming a Cold War battleground.<sup>1</sup>

What are scholars to make of such episodes? Even without knowing its particular origins or outcome, numerous studies would suggest that little good could result from bringing the Cold War into a colonial conflict. Historians have long been critical of how the United States imposed its global priorities regardless of local contexts, confused nationalists with communists, and supported colonial powers rather than risk instability.<sup>2</sup> With the opening of Soviet archives, scholars have also begun to document how Moscow subordinated revolutions in Asia to its own security interests and exploited conflicts in China and Korea for material advantage.<sup>3</sup> But comparatively little attention has been paid to how anti-colonial nationalists, for their part, approached the superpower rivalry. Some scholars assume that they were inevitably losers—even pawns—in that larger game; that it was at best a distraction.<sup>4</sup> But even without access to their archives, others have surmised that leaders such as Mohammed Mosaddeq and Gamal Abdel Nasser found opportunities as well as risks in the Cold War compe-

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tion.<sup>5</sup> The question, then, is not whether the Cold War was a “good” or a “bad” thing for anti-colonial nationalists. Rather, it is how they dealt with the challenges it posed in the formulation of their foreign policies.

With the opening of the Algerian archives—along with those of France, the United States, and the United Kingdom—it is now possible to document elite decision-making during the Arab world’s most bitter anti-colonial conflict. How, it is asked, did Algerians relate their independence struggle to superpower rivalries, and how did the strategies they pursued influence international politics and contribute to their eventual victory? Although much work remains to be done, it is already clear that the Algerian perspective places episodes such as the one described earlier in an entirely new light. Thus, even while Abbas was warning Western journalists that a communist intervention would be a “disaster for the whole world,” Krim worked with his North African allies to exaggerate the danger and drive France to the negotiating table.<sup>6</sup> Indeed, years before the Algerians launched their fight for independence, they had planned to harness the Cold War to their cause. Exploiting international tensions was part of a grand strategy that backed diplomatic lobbying with demonstrations of mass support, attracted foreign media with urban terror, and used U.N. debates to inspire peasant revolutionaries. But the boldest stroke came in 1958, when the Algerians established a provisional government and demanded diplomatic recognition despite the fact that they could not control any of the territory they claimed. The precedents they set would show the way and smooth the path for other national liberation movements. This article will show how, rather than being mere pawns of the great powers, the Algerians rewrote the rules of the game.

The origins of the grand strategy of the Algerian War can be traced to the last day of World War II in Europe. Nationalists had associated themselves with American anti-colonialism and organized celebratory marches. These quickly turned into bloody clashes in which French forces massacred from 6,000 to 45,000 Algerians—mass graves and an official cover-up made an exact accounting impossible.<sup>7</sup> Algeria’s leading opposition figure, Messali Hadj, then turned to electoral politics. His new party, the *Mouvement pour la Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques* (MTLD), won municipal offices across Algeria. But in the 1948 elections, Interior Minister Jules Moch had the MTLD’s candidates arrested while local authorities stuffed ballots for “*Beni oui-ouis*”—Muslim yes-men.<sup>8</sup>

Later that year, the MTLD asked the head of its paramilitary wing, Hocine Aït Ahmed, to advise on how the party might win Algeria’s independence through force of arms. Aït Ahmed was only 27 years old at the time and had never been formally educated in matters of strategy. Even so, he displayed considerable erudition in his report. He analyzed both earlier rebellions against the French and examples from abroad—the 1916 Easter uprising in Ireland, the Yugoslavian resistance, Mao’s Long March, and Indochina—while incorporating insights from Carl von Clausewitz, Ernst Jünger, and B. H. Liddell Hart. All this led him to a sobering conclusion: “[i]f one considers dispassionately contemporary military history . . . one would search in vain even among the fights of colonized peoples against the European powers as great a disproportion in the forces facing each other.” Algeria was only 400 miles from France, and, unlike any other colony, it was constitutionally an integral part of the republic. Moreover, unlike Indochina, most of Algeria was arid, exposed terrain ideal

for the employment of air power. Above all, virtually no other anti-colonial movement had had to deal with such a sizable and politically powerful settler population—the 1 million *pieds noirs*, who exercised a virtual right of veto over French Algerian policy through their lobby in the National Assembly. For all of these reasons, Aït Ahmed ruled out a popular uprising, a liberated zone, or mass demonstrations. He prescribed nothing less than *une grande stratégie* for a truly revolutionary war, relating finances, logistics, morale, propaganda, and foreign policy. This article focuses on this last aspect: the foreign policy of national liberation.<sup>9</sup>

If Algerians had to “integrate the people’s war in the international context,” it was only because Aït Ahmed did not think they could hope to prevail otherwise. Thus, their “vital force” was “the historic movement which leads the peoples of Asia and Africa to fight for their liberation. . . . They will follow our example as we follow the example of other peoples who liberated themselves by force of arms or who are fighting still.” But Aït Ahmed stressed that this was a “dogmatic and sentimental” principle, practical only to the extent that it would cause France to disperse its forces. Instead, their foreign policy would be independent and eminently flexible: “placing the good on one side and the bad on the other would be to ignore the complexity and ambiguity of elements that determine the interest of each country or group of countries.” He knew that the United States, in particular, would never allow North Africa to pass under Soviet influence.<sup>10</sup>

Yet the Americans’ interest created potential leverage, as Aït Ahmed pointed out. Even if the Americans would never be allies, he would exploit their rivalry with the Soviets to undermine their alliance with France. “Our strategy will follow this guideline in diplomatic matters: When we intend to put on our side of the scale an act of support from a Socialist country we will think at the same time of removing from the colonial side of the scale the weight of Western support.” In December, the MTLD Central Committee approved the report in near-unanimity.<sup>11</sup>

In the following years, the MTLD would more often be divided, as younger militants such as Aït Ahmed chafed under Messali’s autocratic rule. After six years, they finally broke away to form the Front de Libération Nationale (National Liberation Front; FLN) and launch the war for independence. It was soon apparent that Aït Ahmed’s report had either inspired the FLN’s strategy or reflected the views of its other leaders. The FLN’s 1 November 1954 proclamation declared among the front’s aims the “internationalization of the Algerian problem” and accorded it the same emphasis as the struggle’s internal, military dimension.<sup>12</sup>

Aït Ahmed joined with his brother-in-law Mohammed Khider, a former National Assembly deputy, and Ahmed Ben Bella, a twice-decorated veteran of the Italian campaign, to form the FLN’s first external delegation. Aït Ahmed and Khider’s orders were to defeat French efforts to define Algeria as an internal affair and to take the FLN’s case to the United Nations. Aït Ahmed would represent the FLN in New York and at international conferences, while in Cairo Khider was responsible for the overall direction of FLN diplomacy. Meanwhile, Ben Bella traveled throughout the Middle East and North Africa arranging arms shipments to the forces fighting in the interior.<sup>13</sup>

At the time, anti-colonialism was only beginning to emerge as a coordinated, international movement, and recently emancipated states were still a small minority at the United Nations. Consequently, the Algerians found it difficult to make headway. In

December 1954, neutral Asian countries meeting in Colombo, Sri Lanka, refused even to mention them in their final communiqué, explaining that it was up to the Arab states to take the lead.<sup>14</sup> On Khider's urging, Saudi Arabia did petition the U.N. Security Council. But most Arab League members were unwilling to challenge French claims that Algeria was juridically an internal affair. The Iranian representative who held the council's rotating presidency declared the whole business to be "perfectly absurd."<sup>15</sup>

Nevertheless, the Quai d'Orsay noted that the Saudi petition had "revealed the supposed existence of an Algerian question to American public opinion, which had been totally unaware of it before." The Interior Ministry was therefore asked to provide information on the number of rebels and the scale of their operations to help "reduce the present events to their exact proportion."<sup>16</sup> In fact, initially the FLN consisted of fewer than 2,500 mujahedin possessing no more than 400 rifles.<sup>17</sup> But the French were already concerned that diplomatic and military actions, however ineffectual in isolation, could together amplify Algerian demands through international organizations and the media, redounding to their disadvantage in world, and especially American, opinion.

The tensions the Algerian war would create in Franco-American relations were already apparent in a National Security Council meeting held three weeks after it began. Admiral Arthur Radford, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, pointed to the central dilemma facing American policy: "the possibility of either losing our whole position in the Middle East by offending the Arabs, or else risking the rupture of our NATO position by offending the French." While Radford advocated "outright support of the Arabs," Secretary of State John Foster Dulles prevailed on President Eisenhower to allow him quietly to urge his French counterparts to implement reforms leading to greater autonomy.<sup>18</sup>

The Bandung conference of Asian and African states in April 1955 exacerbated the Americans' apprehensions. Learning the lessons of the earlier conference, the Algerians prepared the ground by sending propaganda missions to the Colombo countries and joined representatives of the French protectorates of Morocco and Tunisia in a united North African delegation. They obtained a resolution recognizing that all had a right to independence.<sup>19</sup> Almost immediately there was a sharp increase in the number of FLN attacks in Algeria, from 158 in April to 432 in May.<sup>20</sup>

Philippe Tripiet has attributed the escalation to the conference, marking the start of a pattern: "every important international event affecting the allies or sympathizers of the Algerian uprising would immediately have an effect on Algerian opinion and on the morale of the rebels themselves." Conversely, every reported exploit of the rebels within Algeria aided the FLN's allies and irritated the friends of France. "One noticed a phenomenon of resonance and reciprocity," Tripiet concluded, "a natural interaction between the Algerian event and its global context." Indeed, in September 1958 the French delegation to the United Nations ordered a chart showing the correspondence between General Assembly debates on Algeria and the incidence of FLN attacks in Kabylia.<sup>21</sup>

Although many different factors determined the level of rebel activity, Tripiet's account does reflect the perception of French security forces that the FLN's campaign abroad kept the rebellion alive—not surprisingly, because he served as an intelligence

officer during the war. There is also ample contemporary evidence. In September 1955, for instance, the director-general of security in Algiers complained that “it would be difficult to restore calm as long as the nationalists felt they were going to get help from outside.”<sup>22</sup> The French therefore concluded that they could not avoid doing battle with the FLN in the international arena, waging the Algerian war as a kind of world war—a war for world opinion.

The most fiercely contested terrain would be the United States and the United Nations. The French counted on U.S. military and especially diplomatic support, assuming it could easily command a majority in the General Assembly.<sup>23</sup> But in 1955, seventeen states—most of them Eastern bloc or Afro-Asian—were to gain membership. Even so, Aït Ahmed doubted that he had the votes to place the Algerian question on the agenda. Hoping to influence the outcome, shopkeepers in Algiers staged their first general strike on the opening day of the debate while the French deployed troops at strategic points around the city. Once again, an FLN diplomatic campaign coincided with a sharp increase in armed attacks.<sup>24</sup>

On 30 September 1955, the delegates voted in “an electrified atmosphere,” as Aït Ahmed later recalled, with his deputies “counting on their toes.” They won by a single vote, provoking thunderous applause and an abrupt walkout by the French foreign minister, Antoine Pinay.<sup>25</sup> At a dinner party in New York that evening, Pinay launched what a startled British ambassador described as “a ferocious attack” on his Soviet counterpart’s support for the FLN.<sup>26</sup> Absent primary evidence, one can only surmise that this vote was part of Khrushchev’s new Third World strategy. He had scored his first major success earlier that month by supplying arms to Egypt, breaking a Western monopoly in the Middle East. After it was announced that Khrushchev would visit India, Burma, and Afghanistan—where he promised additional aid—Dulles concluded that “[t]he scene of the battle between the free world and the communist world was shifting.”<sup>27</sup>

In November, the United States helped the French U.N. delegation adjourn discussion of the Algerian question. But at the same time, American diplomats began a series of meetings with the FLN. They were particularly impressed with Aït Ahmed, whom they described as “silken in tone and marble-hard in content.” Aït Ahmed warned that “the attitudes of an independent North Africa toward the West would depend on the circumstances in which she won her independence.”<sup>28</sup> Ben Bella, for his part, claimed that the FLN had “closed the door” to the communists. Still, he subtly played on American anxieties, criticizing U.S. support for France not only because it hurt its image in North Africa, but also because it “weakened the defenses of Western Europe against the Soviet Union.” Indeed, the Americans were increasingly concerned about the shift of French forces from NATO to Algeria. Ben Bella was equally astute in suggesting what they might do about it:

There was no thought, he said, that the United States should exert public pressure on France. Such a move would be bound to fail. He hoped however that the United States, behind the scenes, would continually urge the French in the direction of finding a peaceful solution through negotiations with the Algerian Nationalists.<sup>29</sup>

In fact, behind the scenes the United States did urge the French to make concessions and seek a negotiated settlement.<sup>30</sup> In Paris, everyone from communists to conserv-

atives accused Washington of playing a “double game”—pretending to back France while secretly favoring the rebels.<sup>31</sup>

In February 1956, a new French government under Prime Minister Guy Mollet resolved to grant Tunisia and Morocco “independence within interdependence,” calculating that with aid and advisers France could retain these countries as allies, or at least prevent their aiding the FLN. But Mollet complained to U.S. Ambassador Douglas Dillon that the Moroccans “are constantly telling [the] French that they can obtain [aid] more easily and in greater quantities from [the] U.S. than they can from France.” The prime minister insisted that the United States not allow North Africans to play the allies off against each other.<sup>32</sup>

In March, a series of reports arrived in Washington indicating a “dangerously sharp rise in anti-American sentiment.” Without a strong, public statement of U.S. support for France in North Africa, Dillon predicted “an explosion.”<sup>33</sup> Conversely, the new foreign minister, Christian Pineau, pledged that his government “was really determined to reach [an] agreement with [the] Algerian nationalists,” though they could succeed only with U.S. support.<sup>34</sup> Washington finally extended only token aid to the former protectorates, prompting the Tunisians to joke that they would use the money to build an embassy in Moscow.<sup>35</sup> At the same time, Eisenhower approved a qualified but well-publicized endorsement of French policy in Algeria.<sup>36</sup>

Undeterred, Aït Ahmed simply redoubled his efforts, pressing the Afro-Asian caucus to convene a special session of the General Assembly and petition the Security Council. “[T]he more we push the U.S. to implicate itself with colonialism,” he predicted, “the closer will be the day when they will see themselves obliged to bail out.” He urged his allies to make *démarches* to all the NATO capitals, especially to Washington and London. At the same time, he called on Khider to obtain “the most extreme positions possible” from the Arab League. These efforts were interconnected and mutually reinforcing: “extreme” positions by the league would lend urgency to the *démarches* of even “moderate” states such as India, while the collective weight of the Afro-Asian world would compel France’s allies to press for a compromise peace.<sup>37</sup>

The one weak link was Nasser, heretofore the Algerians’ most valued supporter. Worried about French arms shipments to Israel, he was now exploring a possible rapprochement. The bargaining began in March 1956, when Pineau paid a surprise visit to Egypt. Nasser promised not to oppose any settlement in Algeria that had the support of its Muslim population and agreed to arrange a meeting between a French representative and the FLN.<sup>38</sup> In the next three weeks, there was a significant decline in the size of Egyptian arms shipments, which the FLN attributed to the Pineau–Nasser meeting.<sup>39</sup> Both Aït Ahmed and Khider also noted a weakening of Egypt’s diplomatic support at the United Nations and the Arab League.<sup>40</sup>

Nasser’s point man on North Africa, Mohamad Fathi al-Dib, suggested that he make a deal with France. Noting France’s ability to destabilize the region, he would require that country to limit both military aid and Jewish emigration to Israel; to assist in the settlement of the Palestinian problem; and to continue opposing British efforts to form a regional defense organization, the Baghdad Pact. Thus, at the same time a political solution in North Africa was beginning to seem possible, Egypt would make it contingent on these and other French concessions that had nothing whatever to do with Algerian independence—but everything to do with Egypt’s problem with Israel.<sup>41</sup>

Yet even if Pineau had wanted to make this deal, he probably would not have been able to pull it off. Both Mollet and Defense Minister Maurice Bourgès-Maunoury had a deep, sentimental attachment to the Israelis and might have been repulsed rather than tempted by the offer. Moreover, the French government had been powerless to stop the Defense Ministry from sending the Israelis tanks and planes.<sup>42</sup> The Israelis, for their part, were pushing hard from the other direction. As early as June 1955, Shimon Peres, then director-general of the Israeli Defense Ministry, had observed that “[e]very Frenchman killed in North Africa, like every Egyptian killed in the Gaza Strip, takes us one step further towards strengthening the ties between France and Israel.”<sup>43</sup> Israel’s Mossad assisted France’s Service de Documentation Extérieure et de Contre-Espionnage (SDECE) with intelligence on Nasser’s aid to the FLN, which made a French–Egyptian rapprochement even more unlikely.<sup>44</sup> So, too, did a statement by Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion praising France as the only country to supply Israel with weaponry. On 15 May, the Paris daily *Le Monde* reported that the Israelis had contracted for another dozen Mystère IVs, the latest generation of French jet fighters.<sup>45</sup> That same day, Nasser asked Dib to re-evaluate Egypt’s policy. Quickly reversing course, he decided to step up support for the FLN.<sup>46</sup>

Egypt’s increasing aid encouraged the French tendency to view the FLN as a mere instrument of Nasser’s ultimate ambition “to re-create the empire of Islam around Egypt,” as Mollet explained it to Anthony Eden. When Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal in July 1956, Pineau vowed to respond with force, even without allied support.<sup>47</sup> The French finally brokered the agreement that would bring Britain and Israel into the war together. But, ironically, France was preparing to strike at Nasser at precisely the moment the FLN was repudiating Egyptian influence.<sup>48</sup>

On 20 August, the FLN’s leadership within Algeria met secretly in the Soummam valley to compose a common platform.<sup>49</sup> None of the external delegation attended, so Ben Bella could not counter criticism that he was too close to Nasser and had not provided enough arms. The congress’s platform openly criticized “the Arab states in general, and Egypt in particular”:

Their support for the Algerian people’s struggle was limited and was subjected to the fluctuation of their general diplomacy. France exerted a special form of pressure on the Middle East by means of her economic and military aid and her opposition to the Baghdad pact.

The platform denied any role to Algerian communists and condemned the equivocal position of the French Communist Party. Conversely, it downplayed “the rather embarrassed declarations forced out of the representatives of the United States, Great Britain, and NATO” in support of France.<sup>50</sup>

Most significantly, the Soummam congress did not envisage a military victory. Instead, it looked for “the total weakening of the French army to make victory by arms impossible.” Equally important, the FLN would work for “the political isolation of France—in Algeria and in the world.”<sup>51</sup> Toward that end, the platform foresaw a permanent office at the United Nations and in the United States, as well as a delegation in Asia. In fact, by October 1956 there would be eight FLN bureaus: in Cairo, Damascus, Tunis, Beirut, Baghdad, Karachi, Djakarta, and New York. The Soummam congress also called for “mobile delegations” that would visit various capitals and international cultural, student, and trade-union meetings. The FLN had already formed



a labor affiliate, the Union Générale des Travailleurs Algériens, and would create a commercial association the following month, the Union Générale des Commerçants Algériens. While forming links with their counterparts abroad, these organizations would coordinate labor and commercial strikes during the next U.N. debate. They also facilitated indirect contributions to the FLN, including important sums from the CIA, which thereby hedged the public U.S. position behind France.<sup>52</sup>

Thus, the FLN's international strategy—particularly the campaign to undermine U.S. support for France—was a sustained effort that withstood temporary setbacks and had the support of the party's top leaders. The Soummam platform did establish the principle that the interior leaders would have primacy over the exterior, but only because FLN foreign policy was deemed too important to be delegated. The most influential among these leaders, Ramdane Abbane, had already dispatched a personal envoy—Dr. Lamine Debaghine—with nominal authority over the rest of the external delegation. Although Debaghine soon quarreled with his new colleagues—Ben Bella “almost strangled him on several occasions,” according to Khider—the clash was of personalities rather than policies.<sup>53</sup>

The proof came in October 1956, when the French intercepted a plane carrying Khider, Aït Ahmed, Ben Bella, and Mohammed Boudiaf (who had served as liaison to Algeria's Western front). The French introduced their captives as “Ben Bella and his associates,” reflecting both his close ties to Cairo and the French view that they all worked for Nasser. But once officials read their papers, they admitted that the internal leadership was in charge, not the FLN diplomats, and certainly not Ben Bella (though he benefited enormously from the publicity).<sup>54</sup> The internal leaders simply dispatched new representatives abroad to continue their policies under Debaghine's direction.

The arrest of the external delegation and the Suez fiasco only heightened American doubts about Paris's ability to contain the conflict and conclude a compromise peace. Indeed, by this point the best-known Algerian moderate, Ferhat Abbas, had gone over to the FLN. In his first State Department meeting in November 1956, he warned that the war increased the danger of communist infiltration. If the French succeeded in actually decapitating the FLN, “red Maquis” would take over.<sup>55</sup>

Abbas was exaggerating, as there were now close to 20,000 armed regulars in the Armée de Libération Nationale (ALN). In January 1957, the ALN executed almost 4,000 attacks around the country, including more than one hundred within the capital itself—a nearly tenfold increase since May 1955.<sup>56</sup> But the FLN leaders continued to direct their efforts at defeating the French abroad. As Abbane put it:

Is it preferable for our cause to kill ten enemies in some riverbed in Telerghma, which no one will talk about, or rather a single one in Algiers, which the American press will report the next day? Though we are taking some risks, we must make our struggle known.<sup>57</sup>

On 2 January, the FLN's new representative in New York, M'Hammed Yazid, called for U.N. sponsorship of renewed negotiations based on a recognition of Algeria's right to independence.<sup>58</sup> That same day, the head of ALN forces in Algiers, Larbi Ben M'Hidi, began to prepare for a general strike. “As the UN session approaches,” he explained, “it is necessary to demonstrate that all the people are behind us and obey our orders to the letter.” This would negate the French government's argument against

negotiating—that is, that the FLN represented no one if it did not actually represent Nasser. The rest of the leadership agreed unanimously, and leaflets announced and explained the action as directed at the U.N. debate.<sup>59</sup>

In what became known as the Battle of Algiers, French paratroopers marched into the Algerian capital, broke the strike, and systematically dismantled Ben M'Hidi's organization. In the following months, the French would send 24,000 Muslims from the city to internment centers, where torture was systematically practiced. This was more than four times as many as the entire FLN organization there, and almost 10 percent of the city's total Muslim population. By the end of the year, nearly 4,000 people had disappeared without a trace.<sup>60</sup>

Meanwhile, Abbas and Yazid struggled to win support for a forceful U.N. resolution, but they were outgunned and outspent. Mollet met with no fewer than thirty-six ambassadors in Paris, while in New York Pineau personally lobbied most heads of delegations.<sup>61</sup> When diplomacy did not suffice, SDECE agents distributed outright bribes.<sup>62</sup> The French Information Center, for its part, delivered propaganda films to American television stations that were shown more than 1,500 times to an estimated 60 million viewers. The \$450,000 that the French Information Center was estimated to have spent on a full-page advertisement in the thirty-one largest U.S. newspapers was more than ten times the FLN office's entire budget.<sup>63</sup>

The Algerians were finally forced to settle for a compromise resolution that merely called for “a peaceful, democratic, and just solution . . . conforming to the principles of the United Nations charter.”<sup>64</sup> With the sacrifices being made in Algiers, this could only disappoint the FLN leadership. That same day, they decided to abandon the city and direct the rebellion from Tunis. Even before they arrived, Ben Bella's representative was attacking their record. “We have risked the dismantling of the revolutionary organization to make a noise at the United Nations,” he exclaimed. “It's stupid and ridiculous!”<sup>65</sup>

Yet as Abbane had anticipated, the risks the FLN ran were repaid with media attention in France and around the world. Indeed, as French methods came to light, the Battle of Algiers began to appear as a Pyrrhic victory. Authorities banned articles and books about torture, but this merely lent these works cachet and did not stop FLN publicists from citing them to argue that France had violated the U.N. resolution. Translations of Henri Alleg's *La Question* became best-sellers elsewhere in Europe and in the United States.<sup>66</sup> Censorship also made “the worst impression abroad,” as the French Director of Information and Press Pierre Baraduc pointed out in March 1958.<sup>67</sup> Even writers who condemned the FLN, Ambassador Hervé Alphand reported, “observed that the persistence of terrorism implicitly attests to the fact that France cannot take the situation in hand. . . . [L]ittle by little, [this] prepares American public opinion for the idea that the Algerian question is on the way to becoming an international problem.”<sup>68</sup>

French propagandists therefore began to ignore the war and emphasize their efforts to “develop” Algeria. As Baraduc argued, “Each time that one can speak of something other than blood in Algeria . . . this is progress for pacification because it represents a return to normal.”<sup>69</sup> Yet a “return to normal” did not interest newsmen attracted to a story with strong visuals and plenty of violence. Although the FLN could not equal France in its propaganda output, the FLN gained a decisive advantage in “free media.”

The radio and television formats rewarded the FLN for creating controversy and providing combat footage, whereas the French would not even dignify their adversary with a debate. The host of a CBS radio program, Blair Clark, resorted to letting an FLN spokesman sitting in the studio debate the network's correspondent in Algiers.<sup>70</sup> Similarly, Chet Huntley of NBC TV's *Outlook* program showed clips taken by mujahedin using a portable camera. Perhaps the scenes of children crying beside their parents' corpses and French soldiers falling to the ALN were staged, as the French maintained, but they obviously made a greater impact than propaganda films such as *Water, Crops, and Men*.<sup>71</sup> And what did it matter if, as Paris complained, Italian and German correspondents who thought they were accompanying FLN raids never really left Tunisia? By making the rebels appear to control parts of Algeria, these reports buttressed the FLN's claims to international recognition. As one French diplomat later remarked about FLN visits to the State Department, "It's not the reality of what they say or do, but the way it is represented in the radios of Tunis and Cairo and the myth that it gives life to in [Algeria]." Indeed, this "myth" of a conquering army and diplomats with entrée to every chancellery would gradually help to transform reality within Algeria itself, inspiring nationalists to persist in their struggle and making the once unassailable notion of *Algérie française* itself seem illusory.<sup>72</sup>

In the near-term, the FLN focused on inciting international opposition to the Algerian war and using Tunisia as a safe haven in which to regroup its forces. The French, for their part, began to fortify the border with electrified fences, minefields, and radar-directed artillery. This led to a series of clashes that drew in Tunisia's own small army, leading President Habib Bourguiba to threaten to turn to Egypt or the Eastern bloc for arms that France now refused to supply.<sup>73</sup> The Tunisian arms crisis, as it came to be known, culminated in November 1957 with an Anglo-American decision to provide a small but symbolic shipment, despite the vociferous objections by the new French government led by Prime Minister Félix Gaillard. As Eisenhower described it, Gaillard had threatened "a complete breakup of the Western alliance."<sup>74</sup>

Yet the worst crisis came in February 1958, when the French bombed a Tunisian border village that they alleged to be an ALN base, inflicting scores of civilian casualties. Within hours, Bourguiba had brought foreign correspondents and cameramen to the scene, and the resulting articles and images created a public-relations fiasco for Paris. After barricading French troops in their bases, Bourguiba threatened to petition the U.N. Security Council before accepting American and British mediation. All through the talks, Bourguiba sought to expand their mandate to include a settlement of the Algerian war while rejecting any measures that might have hindered the ALN.<sup>75</sup> Meanwhile, the rebel command sent whole battalions against the French border fortifications, leading to some of the most intense fighting of the war.<sup>76</sup>

By word and deed, passivity and aggressivity, the Tunisians and Algerians together were forcing each of the foreign powers to weigh in on the future of North Africa. Virtually all had struggled to avoid an unqualified commitment to either French Algeria or independence—America playing a "double game," Germany conducting a "double strategy," Italy pursuing a "two-track" policy, Britain publicly supportive but privately skeptical<sup>77</sup>—because none, not even the USSR, wanted to see French influence eradicated in the region. Thus, the Soviet deputy foreign minister urged Paris to undertake "an 'audacious' initiative" or risk being replaced by the United States.<sup>78</sup> Indeed, Dulles had already told Alaphand that it was "indispensable that you look for a political

solution while there is still time.” He warned, “[W]hatever may be the French determination to continue the fight, . . . financial conditions could, at some point, stand in their way.” Only two months before, France had narrowly averted a balance-of-payments crisis thanks to loans from the United States, the International Monetary Fund, and the European Payments Union. Dulles noted that certain, U.S. senators had asked him to go back on the decision. With a new financial crisis looming, and France ever more isolated, his words carried considerable weight.<sup>79</sup>

A week later, the American member of the “good offices” mission, Robert Murphy, sought British support in demanding that France accept a cease-fire and an international conference on Algeria. If Paris did not agree, the United States would be forced to provide political, economic, and military support to Tunisia and Morocco—thus placing America behind France’s adversaries in a public and definitive fashion.<sup>80</sup> The perception that the United States was unfairly pressuring Paris caused the downfall of the Gaillard government. But leading candidates to succeed him were prepared to work with the Americans. On 1 May, René Pleven told U.S. Ambassador Amory Houghton that he “would hope that we would be willing to use our contacts with [the] FLN, if good enough, to try to get it to discuss a cease-fire.” Mollet, for his part, favored sending a negotiating team to meet with the Algerians.<sup>81</sup> Their long and patient efforts to secure U.S. support for a negotiated settlement appeared to be on the brink of success.

But rather than submit to a “diplomatic *Dien Bien Phu*,” the *pieds noirs* rose up on 13 May, and, under the leadership of the local army commanders, demanded the return of de Gaulle. Assuming full powers on 1 June, de Gaulle quickly settled the border conflict with Tunisia and restored confidence in France’s ability to end the war. Yet it soon became clear the general would make peace only on his own terms, which did not include political negotiations with the FLN or full independence for Algeria.<sup>82</sup>

De Gaulle’s return was a massive setback for the FLN’s international strategy. “We’ve settled into the war, the world has also gotten used to it,” the FLN’s chief of armaments and logistics, Omar Ouamrane, bitterly observed two months later. The world would “continue to turn to the Algerian war as long as it lasts, if necessary until the last Algerian.” The ALN had suffered demoralizing losses in assaults on the French border fortifications. Soon they would become all but impenetrable as French forces set to work stamping out the insurgents of the interior. Diplomatically, de Gaulle could “permanently bar the way to the West and neutralize the Eastern bloc,” Ouamrane wrote. “He has already succeeded in partially cutting us off from our own brothers.” After making a separate deal with de Gaulle, the Tunisians joined the Moroccans in urging the FLN to accept less than full independence.<sup>83</sup>

Instead, Ouamrane called for a “truly revolutionary political and diplomatic action”—though it was an action that Aït Ahmed had already suggested nearly two years before. In fact, Ouamrane was inspired by a study he had written in his prison cell in the Santé.<sup>84</sup> Here is how Ouamrane summarized Aït Ahmed’s critical insight:

Our whole policy consists of requesting, of demanding our independence. We demand it from the enemy. We want that our brothers, our friends, the U.N. recognize it. We ask it of everyone except ourselves, forgetting that independence proclaims itself and is not given.<sup>85</sup>

Aït Ahmed argued instead that by unilaterally declaring independence and establishing a provisional government, the FLN could drive France to the negotiating table. First, re-establishing the *dawla*—or state—was the dream of generations of Algerian

Muslims; it would now inspire them to persist in their struggle. The Arab and Asian states would be “forced, by their public opinion and by mutual competition for interests and prestige, to conform their actual policy to their profession of faith.” By obtaining their recognition, Algeria would be perceived as an integral part—rather than merely as an outward sign—of the Afro-Asian movement, which was the object of increasing superpower competition. And if the provisional government won recognition from the communist states, the Americans might be led to end their “complacency and capitulations” to French blackmail. Finally, a campaign for recognition could be conducted continuously, unlike the once-a-year test of strength in the U.N. General Assembly. Each success would galvanize the energy of the Algerian people and help convince Paris that the process was irreversible.<sup>86</sup>

So on 19 September 1958, Ferhat Abbas called a press conference in Cairo to announce the formation of the GPRA, with himself as president. Despite having discouraged this initiative, Morocco and Tunisia immediately extended diplomatic recognition, explaining to Paris that they would otherwise be subject to attack from more militant states such as Egypt and Iraq—just as Aït Ahmed had anticipated. Indeed, every Arab state except Lebanon immediately joined them.<sup>87</sup> China’s recognition came within the week, followed shortly by North Vietnam, North Korea, and Indonesia. All together, thirteen of some eighty-three states recognized the GPRA within ten days of its creation.<sup>88</sup>

While the GPRA sent delegations to the communist states, its forty-five representatives abroad—accredited and not—were initially concentrated in Middle Eastern and Western European countries, twenty in total.<sup>89</sup> In theory, they reported to Debaghine, now designated foreign minister. But given the circumstances in which they worked, all of the GPRA’s ministries had to deal with other governments—or evade them—in order to carry out their functions. By June 1960, French intelligence counted 177 GPRA officials in thirty-eight countries, not counting Tunisia and Morocco. But this figure included—and doubtless excluded—dozens working clandestinely as recruiters or money collectors in emigrant communities.<sup>90</sup> Although all of this was inimical to rational organization, it would have been impossible for the Foreign Ministry’s small staff to oversee the entirety of Algerian activities abroad.<sup>91</sup> Rather than implying the insignificance of foreign affairs for the GPRA this attested to its all-encompassing importance. With a Ministry of Armaments dealing with everyone from German arms dealers to communist China, and a Ministry of General Liaisons running bagmen and agents across Europe and the Middle East, nothing was “foreign” to the new government. Indeed, in 1960 even the “minister of the interior,” Lakhdar Bentobbal, concluded that “each one of our agencies, military, political, diplomatic, social, associational or otherwise should act in its area according to the same objective: *INTERNATIONALIZATION*.”<sup>92</sup> In that year, the French estimated, the GPRA’s expenditures abroad—for arms purchases, maintenance, support for refugees, and so on—had nearly equaled expenditures in the five Algerian *Wilayat*. The GPRA was like a state turned inside out.<sup>93</sup>

De Gaulle’s strategy was to reverse this process of internationalization and isolate the GPRA. Like his predecessors, he believed that the provisional government would not otherwise acknowledge defeat.<sup>94</sup> His main concern was that the Algerians and their allies would exploit the competition between the United States and the USSR,

observing that “the Arabs were past masters in playing off one white power against another.”<sup>95</sup> He therefore called for a tripartite organization that would divide the world into French, British, and American spheres of influence. In September 1958, he warned that such an organization was “indispensable,” and that France “subordinates to it as of now all development of its present participation in NATO.” Thus, both sides escalated their international campaigns without fundamentally altering their strategies.<sup>96</sup>

During the U.N. debate on Algeria in December 1958, three GPRA ministers toured China, North Vietnam, and North Korea. Soon the press was reporting that they had requested economic and military aid—even volunteers. Yet this visit did not provoke a violent reaction from the West, as a GPRA official noted. Indeed, the United States refused to vote with France’s supporters at the United Nations. More than half of the U.N. General Assembly explicitly recognized the GPRA, though a resolution calling for “negotiations between the two parties” failed by a single vote to obtain the requisite two-thirds majority. The U.S. abstention was “incontestably a success” from Abbas’s standpoint, encouraging the Algerians’ efforts to exploit the escalating “war of nerves” between the putative allies.<sup>97</sup> The French U.N. representative, for his part, observed that “[i]f the FLN has lost ground in Algeria, there is little doubt that it has gained a good deal on the international level and in all the countries of the world where it has sent missions, especially the United States and the United Nations.”<sup>98</sup>

There were a number of reasons for the American abstention, but the main one remained Dulles’s and Eisenhower’s determination not to alienate Third World opinion. It is indicative of this attitude that what worried the secretary about de Gaulle’s tripartite proposal “was not so much its impact on NATO countries but the disastrous effects it would have on countries in Africa and the Middle East.”<sup>99</sup> De Gaulle retaliated by withdrawing the French Mediterranean fleet from NATO command.<sup>100</sup> His new prime minister, Michel Debré, instructed French ambassadors that Algeria was now the “first priority” of the government and its foreign policy. “[I]t is imperative that the rebellion lose the support and complacency that it currently benefits from,” he asserted, “and that it feel abandoned and asphyxiated.”<sup>101</sup>

Denying the GPRA diplomatic recognition was therefore critical to French strategy. Since September 1958, Lebanon and Mongolia had joined the group of states that recognized the provisional government. French spokesmen privately suggested that a Muslim or Arab country could not do otherwise. But if de Gaulle was not unduly exercised by anything Ulan Bator said or did, he warned in April 1959 that Paris would sever ties with any “responsible” state that followed suit. Nevertheless, nothing was done to Ghana after it accorded de facto recognition that summer, thus extending the zone of French tolerance to all of Africa. Otherwise, in trying to isolate the GPRA, France risked isolating itself.<sup>102</sup>

Algeria’s evident importance to Paris encouraged unfriendly states to turn the war to their advantage. In August 1959, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko warned his French counterpart, Maurice Couve de Murville, that Moscow would drop the restraint it had displayed on Algeria if Paris continued to back West Germany on Berlin.<sup>103</sup> Conversely, German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer’s support for French Algeria—including tolerance for SDECE operations against arms traders and GPRA officials in West Germany—mitigated the credit de Gaulle hoped to obtain for his

uncompromising stance, even if Adenauer was too skilled a statesman to link these issues explicitly.<sup>104</sup> Francisco Franco, on the other hand, called on de Gaulle to end tolerance toward dissident Spanish emigrés, as Madrid had already done vis-à-vis the Algerians. De Gaulle flatly refused, denying any equivalence between the Spanish republicans and the Algerian provisional government, but the whole conversation must have been distasteful to him.<sup>105</sup> It was from such episodes that de Gaulle concluded that Algeria “undermines the position of France in the world,” as he said at the time. “As long as we are not relieved of it, we can do nothing in the world. This is a terrible burden. It is necessary to relinquish it.”<sup>106</sup>

So on 16 September 1959, de Gaulle declared: “[t]aking into account all the givens—Algerian, national, and international—I consider it necessary that the principle of self-determination be proclaimed from today.” After peace was restored, Muslims would decide their own future in a referendum to which de Gaulle would invite “informants from the whole world.” At first some actually dismissed the speech as intended only for foreign consumption. De Gaulle himself privately explained that he hoped “to defuse the debate at the U.N. at the end of September.”<sup>107</sup>

Yet despite de Gaulle’s acceptance of self-determination, the Americans still refused to associate themselves with his Algerian policy. “How could we say that we support the French and still not damage our interests?” Eisenhower asked in an August 1959 National Security Council meeting. Interpreting a proposed policy statement, he stated that “a solution ‘in consonance with U.S. interests’ meant that we should avoid the charge that we were one of the colonial powers.” He would not openly side with de Gaulle, no matter what he proposed, as long as it was not immediately accepted by the Algerians.<sup>108</sup>

Eisenhower’s reasoning shows why, as the French representative Armand Bérard wrote in July 1959, “the evolution of the situation in North Africa and that of our position at the U.N. are going in exactly opposite directions.”<sup>109</sup> Indeed, by that point the number of ALN regulars within Algeria had declined by a third from its peak, while a quarter of their weapons lacked parts or ammunition. Moreover, morale was suffering: the proportion of prisoners to killed rose from 27 percent to 42 percent over the same period, and there was a doubling in the monthly rate of rebels voluntarily rallying to the French.<sup>110</sup> The impossibility of breaching the border fortifications without staggering losses prevented reinforcement while creating disciplinary problems in the armies left idle on the frontier, problems that contributed to a deterioration in relations with Tunisia and Morocco.<sup>111</sup>

The evolution Bérard traced was not inexorable. In fact, the U.N. General Assembly resolution calling for negotiations barely missed the required two-thirds majority. But after having achieved virtually the same result as in 1958 despite making a maximum effort to win over world opinion, it was now clear that de Gaulle could not domesticate the Algerian question. The cause of Algerian independence had taken on a life of its own at the United Nations and around the world. And this, in turn, had begun to help sustain loyalty to the provisional government within Algeria despite the reversals suffered by the ALN. French officials touring Algeria in January 1960 discovered that “the successes, even relative, of the FLN in the international arena seem to have deeply affected Muslim opinion.”<sup>112</sup>

Yet de Gaulle would have to overcome the opposition of the *pièdes noirs* and his

own military, who did not see why they had to concede to the GPRA what it could not win in the field. That same month, another settler uprising once again forced de Gaulle to rule out political negotiations. Debaghine's successor as foreign minister, Belkacem Krim, therefore embarked on the risky strategy that culminated in the episode described at the outset of this article. Debaghine had already provided the rationale in an October 1959 memorandum. Noting that U.S. support for France weakened the moment it was rumored that China might back the Algerians, he proposed that they continue to escalate. De Gaulle's difficulties increasingly affected the West, Debaghine noted, and "[t]he process is going to intensify":

The Arab states will commit themselves further, and so too will the Afro-Asian countries. On the French side it will be necessary to involve the West even more. The radicalization of the war, with the co-belligerence of the Arab countries and the participation of Chinese volunteers, will lead in the end to a confrontation between the West and the East. . . . The final stage is the intervention of China. This will lead the West to put a stop to the war in Algeria. If not this would be world war.<sup>113</sup>

Krim confirmed this shift in Algerian strategy in "Our Foreign Policy and the Cold War," one of the first memoranda he wrote as foreign minister. The Algerians would no longer present themselves as potential allies of the United States or limit themselves to threats to turn to "the East." Although the goal remained the same—to exacerbate divisions in the West and thereby exert indirect pressure on Paris—they would pursue it through a policy of brinkmanship, confronting France's allies with actual and increasing communist support.<sup>114</sup> This aid might also help militarily, but for Krim that was secondary. Thus, when he formally called for foreign volunteers—initially limited to the Arab and African states—there was no discussion of how they might actually be used. "The modalities of putting this into practice will be discussed and debated later," he explained in an internal note. "Right now what matters is to conduct a vigorous propaganda [campaign] around the principle of volunteering and above all to demonstrate, if the war continues, de Gaulle alone will be responsible and world peace will be directly threatened." For Krim, both African and Arab support were alike a "means of pressuring the East and the West."<sup>115</sup>

Thus, even while the Algerians' international strategy came to encompass East and West, North and South, it remained interdependent and essentially political in nature. Support by African and Arab states sought after by the superpowers would compel the communists to provide more active assistance, while the threat of increasing communist influence or even direct intervention would cause France's allies to compel a settlement. Yet, as in the earlier phase, a weak link could cause the whole plan to unravel. That weak link was now located in Moscow.

The Soviets had always been reluctant to give the Algerians more than their General Assembly votes. In addition to their solicitude for French communists and fear that the United States would fill any vacuum in North Africa, more forthright support would cost them a valuable bargaining chip in relations with de Gaulle—especially while the Berlin question was unsettled and a summit in Paris was imminent. Indeed, Krim was nervous about a rapprochement between the great powers, as he made clear during a conversation in Beijing on 1 May 1960. He told the Chinese vice premier that he "would have loved to see . . . the Soviet Union adopt very firm positions like



those of the government of the People's Republic of China" and asked him to make certain that Khrushchev acted as an advocate for colonized peoples.<sup>116</sup> Considering their divide-and-conquer strategy, the Algerians had reason to fear that a relaxation in superpower tensions "would materialize on our backs," as they had told Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru two years before.<sup>117</sup> But that same day, the Soviets shot down Gary Powers's U-2 spy plane. De Gaulle backed Eisenhower in the midst of the collapsing summit, and, in retaliation, Khrushchev condemned his "war against the Algerian people that has lasted five years and for which France needs American support." This ended the danger that détente posed to Algerian diplomacy.<sup>118</sup>

When the Soviets extended de facto recognition to the GPRA in October, Yazid demanded a meeting with a high-level U.S. State Department official to warn that the pro-Western faction was losing power.<sup>119</sup> Later that month, Abbas formally appealed for Chinese "volunteers." At the same time, Morocco's Crown Prince Hassan told the British ambassador that the Algerians had delivered a written request to admit them. He warned British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan that he could not delay their entry more than two months, urging progress toward peace talks before the U.N. General Assembly debated the question. Macmillan called it "a very dangerous" proposal and urged Hassan not to force the Western powers to choose between Paris and the GPRA. Bourguiba tipped off the Lebanese ambassador—who quickly passed the tip on to his French colleague—that soon "Chinese hordes" would sweep across North Africa.<sup>120</sup>

In fact, Hassan and Krim concocted this request for the express purpose of "putting pressure on Macmillan," as Krim noted at the time. "Result: Macmillan felt the pressure." The GPRA's foreign minister was equally pleased with Hassan's self-imposed deadline, "[w]hich leaves the Anglo-Americans two months to make their move and avoid letting Algeria become a theater of the Cold War." Little did they know that Krim and Hassan were talking about only forty technicians, hardly the makings of a horde. Even so, the Moroccans were genuinely reluctant to admit the Chinese, with the minister of the interior suggesting instead that they might join the GPRA as co-belligerents. But Krim insisted, explaining that "Chinese and Russian intervention has a much greater political effect because it constitutes a more immediate danger for the West."<sup>121</sup>

The British and the Americans quickly rose to the bait. On 26 October, London pressed de Gaulle to declare his peaceful intentions or risk defeat in the U.N. General Assembly. A week later, the U.S. State Department stepped up the pressure, warning that it would not otherwise defend the French position. The very next day, de Gaulle declared that he was prepared to negotiate with the GPRA over a referendum in Algeria that he admitted would inevitably result in an independent republic.<sup>122</sup>

Nevertheless, the GPRA continued to press for a resolution that called for a U.N.-supervised referendum. There was no chance that the French would allow it, but they continued to fear that diplomatic victories strengthened the Algerian bargaining position.<sup>123</sup> Ironically, by this point the Algerians themselves would have opposed a U.N. intervention, mindful of the chaos then occurring in the Congo. But, as they explained to Yugoslavia's Marshal Tito, "we also knew, on the one hand, that General de Gaulle was frightened by the idea of an internationalization of the Algerian prob-

lem and that, on the other hand, our proposition would deepen the divisions that reign among France's allies."<sup>124</sup>

Yet while neither Paris nor the GPRA considered the United Nations capable of halting hostilities, the U.N. General Assembly debate had taken on a life of its own in Algeria. In August 1960, a meeting of top French officials in Algiers found that most Muslims increasingly thought that only the United Nations could end the conflict. The French Delegate General's monthly report for September agreed. Similarly, in October de Gaulle's adviser on Algeria found that Muslims were showing increasing interest in the provisional government's activities abroad and the upcoming U.N. General Assembly debate. Indeed, Bentobbal urged them "not to place too much hope in the decisions of the U.N. so as not to be disappointed." But they appeared not to listen, even placing hopes in the outcome of the American presidential election because of its potential impact in Algeria. Thus, a correspondent who visited an ALN camp high in the Atlas mountains at the time was astonished to find grizzled mujahedin asking what John F. Kennedy's chances were against Richard M. Nixon, doubtless recalling a 1957 speech in which Kennedy had called for Algerian independence. On the night of the election, ALN fighters listened to transistor radios as the returns came in, cheering whenever Kennedy pulled ahead, cursing when Nixon threatened to overtake him.<sup>125</sup>

In December 1960, as the debate was about to begin in New York, de Gaulle decided to go to Algeria. In five days he faced four separate assassination plots and innumerable mobs of angry *pièdes noirs*. But while this was fully expected, no one was prepared for the Muslims of Algiers and Oran to mount a massive counter-protest. Marching in the thousands from the Casbah, they waved homemade Algerian flags and chanted "long live the GPRA!"—much to the surprise of the provisional government itself. It was all the more shocking for rioting *Algérie française* activists, forcing them to wheel around and close ranks with the police.<sup>126</sup>

Meanwhile, the demonstrations in Algiers led France's supporters in New York to waver. Once moderate delegations, such as India's, violently attacked the repression. Even normally friendly representatives from Francophone African states such as Mali and Togo defected.<sup>127</sup> The paragraph calling for an internationally supervised referendum failed by a single vote. But a majority of sixty-three to eight demanded guarantees for self-determination for the whole of Algeria—de Gaulle had floated rumors of a possible partition—and insisted on a U.N. role. As a French army report noted, "Nearly all the nations of the world have thus proved their will to end the Algerian conflict, if need be by foreign intervention."<sup>128</sup>

Once again, Algerians had paid a heavy price for a diplomatic victory. Yet perhaps the most significant casualties were three political myths, as the *New Yorker* magazine's Paris correspondent, Janet Flanner, wrote at the time: the myth that Algeria was French, that only a handful of rebels wanted independence, and that de Gaulle alone could impose peace.<sup>129</sup> It also marked the moment at which another "myth" became reality: the once mythical notion that a national liberation movement could triumph without having liberated any of the national territory. It was the culmination of the strategy Aït Ahmed had first articulated more than a decade before, a strategy that all along aimed at establishing a mutually reinforcing relationship between the Algerians'

diplomatic campaigns abroad and manifestations of popular support at home. Although more than a year of negotiations remained—during which the Algerians would continually threaten to invite direct intervention by their Soviet and Chinese supporters—independence was at hand.<sup>130</sup>

This article can only begin to suggest the kinds of research made possible by the opening of the GPRA archives, which will doubtless enrich our understanding of the social, cultural, and military aspects of the Algerian war. But one can offer some tentative conclusions about its international history, especially because we can compare the Algerian archives with those of France and its two main allies, the United States and the United Kingdom. For instance, the inverse relationship between France's military strength and the progressive weakening of its hold on Algeria has been called the "supreme paradox" of this long struggle.<sup>131</sup> This paradox now appears to be a matter of perspective. Even before the war began, the FLN leaders did not consider winning a conventional victory to be possible. At the peak of their military strength, they continued to conduct operations for the purpose of achieving diplomatic and propaganda victories. And even when they invited outside intervention, it was intended to compel France's allies to force de Gaulle to negotiate.

From the point of view of French governments, on the other hand, the problems this strategy presented were indeed paradoxical and ultimately insuperable. Concentrating on the war within Algeria—the initial response of both the Fourth and Fifth Republics—allowed the nationalists to develop diplomatic, military, and economic resources abroad with which to harry the French on every front. But engaging them in the external arena made the war even more of an international struggle, one in which France had to deliver and receive blows and risk becoming vulnerable to its adversaries and dependent on its allies. French attempts to isolate the Algerians led to crises in which the French themselves were isolated, and their own efforts to win over international opinion led them to move steadily toward conceding independence. Where once holding on to Algeria appeared like "the last chance for French power," the GPRA's international campaigns finally convinced French leaders that they had no chance of restoring their stature without relinquishing Algeria.<sup>132</sup> We cannot know when and how the Algerians might have won without pursuing this strategy. But it is altogether clear that their adversaries always considered their support abroad to be their main strength and ultimate refuge.

Just as Algeria's independence is impossible to explain without placing it in an international context, the war had an equal if not opposite impact on the outside world—what Elie Kedourie called "prodigious peripeties."<sup>133</sup> It accelerated decolonization in Morocco, Tunisia, and Sub-Saharan Africa; it contributed to France's decision to back Israel and confront Nasser; it triggered the fall of the Fourth Republic and the return of de Gaulle; and it provoked de Gaulle into beginning the withdrawal of French forces from NATO commands. And although the Algerians never sent foreign volunteers into combat, their example attracted and influenced key figures in the next generation of national liberation movements. Thus, when the ALN marched in a victory parade through its main base in Morocco, Nelson Mandela was there to see it, having come to learn revolutionary strategy and tactics. The mujahedin appeared to Mandela like an apparition of the future ANC forces. And when the FLN finally entered Algiers in triumph, Yasir Arafat was in the crowd cheering. He would con-

sciously model Fatah after the FLN. Soon Algiers became known as the “Mecca of the revolutionaries.”<sup>134</sup>

In fact, other revolutionary movements would have to develop their own strategies, though the Algerians had shown that it was not enough simply to play off the superpowers. Instead, they exploited every international rivalry that offered potential leverage—revisionist against conservative Arab states, the Arab League against Asian neutrals, China against the USSR, the communist powers against the Western allies, and, above all, the United States against France itself. To that end, the Algerians projected a more or less “moderate” or “pro-Western” image according to the tactical needs of the moment, encouraging outsiders to view personal rivalries among Algerian leaders through their own geo-political and ideological preconceptions. Consequently, a lessening of international tensions was potentially disastrous, as in the case of France and Egypt and, still more, the United States and the USSR. Yet the Algerians did not need to win support from both sides in all these different struggles. As Aït Ahmed had predicted, it was no less effective to use aid from the communist powers to undermine France’s position among its allies.

No amount of diplomatic virtuosity would have sufficed if the GPRA’s activities abroad had not visibly resonated with the people it represented. The genius of the provisional government’s grand strategy was to ensure that political, diplomatic, and military campaigns were mutually reinforcing, so that Algiers and New York, Beijing, and Paris, became theaters in the same struggle. By thinking and acting globally to attain their goals at home and abroad, the Algerians revealed how even a stateless and embattled people could be authors of their own history, a history in which the Cold War was a small but essential part.

#### NOTES

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<sup>1</sup>“Note,” 5 October 1960, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères (hereafter, MAE), Paris, Europe 1944–60, URSS, dossier 271; La Grandville to Couve de Murville, 7 October 1960, MAE, Mission de liaison algérien (hereafter, MLA), Action Extérieure, URSS, dossier 88; Abbas to Zhou Enlai, 24 October 1960, Mohammed Harbi, ed., *Les Archives de la révolution algérienne* (Paris: Editions Jeune Afrique, 1981), 527–28; 466th meeting of the National Security Council, 7 November 1960, *Foreign Relations of the United States* (hereafter, *FRUS*, with year and volume) 1958–60, vol. 13 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1992), 706.

<sup>2</sup>William Appleman Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy: United States Foreign Policy 1945–1980* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1959, 1988); Robert J. McMahon, “Eisenhower and Third World Nationalism: A Critique of the Revisionists,” *Political Science Quarterly* 101 (1986): 453–73; Gabriel Kolko, *Confronting the Third World* (New York: Pantheon, 1988). More recently, scholars have credited the Eisenhower administration with an appreciation for the force of anti-colonial nationalism, particularly in the Middle East and North Africa, while emphasizing the dilemmas it presented for U.S. policy. See H. W. Brands, *The Specter of Neutralism: The United States and the Emergence of the Third World, 1947–1960* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989); Peter Hahn, *The United States, Great Britain, and*

*Egypt, 1945–1956: Strategy and Diplomacy in the Early Cold War* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991); Egya N. Sangmuah, “Eisenhower and Containment in North Africa, 1956–1960,” *Middle East Journal* 44 (1990): 76–91; Irwin M. Wall, “The United States, Algeria, and the Fall of the Fourth French Republic,” *Diplomatic History* 18 (1994): 489–511.

<sup>3</sup>See, for instance, Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996), 54–62; Chen Jian, “The Sino-Soviet Alliance and China’s Entry into the Korean War,” Cold War International History Project (hereafter, CWIHP) Working Paper No. 1 (1993), 8–9; Kathryn Weathersby, “Korea 1949–50: To Attack, or Not to Attack? Stalin, Kim Il Sung, and the Prelude to War,” *CWIHP Bulletin*, no. 5 (1995), 3.

<sup>4</sup>Paul Gordon Lauren, *Power and Prejudice: The Politics and Diplomacy of Racial Discrimination*, 2nd ed. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1996), 220–21; Thomas Borstelmann, *Apartheid’s Reluctant Uncle: The United States and Southern Africa During the Early Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 195.

<sup>5</sup>Zachary Karabell, *Architects of Intervention: The United States, the Third World, and the Cold War, 1946–1962* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1999), 65–67; Fawaz Gerges, *The Superpowers and the Middle East: Regional and International Politics, 1955–1967* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1994), 38–39, 245–46.

<sup>6</sup>Waverly Root, “Offer of Massive Chinese Aid Hangs over Algerian Talks,” *Washington Post*, 20 July 1960, A8, and see later for an analysis of the episode. The GPRA archives are quite accessible—especially when compared with some of those in France—pace Charles-Robert Ageron, “A Propos des Archives militaires de la Guerre d’Algérie,” *Vingtième Siècle* 63 (1999): 128–29.

<sup>7</sup>Charles-Robert Ageron, *Modern Algeria: A History from 1830 to the Present*, trans. Michael Brett (London: Hurst, 1991), 98–102; John Ruedy, *Modern Algeria: The Origins and Development of a Nation* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), 147–50. For evidence of the cover-up, see Bergé to Bringard, 17 June 1945, Archives d’Outre-Mer (hereafter, AOM), Aix-en-Provence, Ministère des Affaires Algériennes (MAA), dossier 586, and Barrat, “Additif à mon Rapport sur les événements de Guelma,” 27 June 1945, *ibid.*

<sup>8</sup>Moch to Schuman, 31 January 1948, AOM, MAA, dossier 18; Charles-André Julien, *L’Afrique du Nord en Marche. Nationalismes Musulmans et Souveraineté Française* (Paris: Julliard, 1952), 284–88.

<sup>9</sup>“Rapport d’Aït Ahmed,” December 1948, in Harbi, *Les Archives*, 15–49. Harbi’s collection has long been virtually the only source of internal documents from the nationalist movement. It still serves as a valuable supplement to the state archives.

<sup>10</sup>*Ibid.*, 43–44.

<sup>11</sup>*Ibid.*, 44; Hocine Aït Ahmed, *Mémoires d’un combattant: L’esprit de l’indépendance, 1942–1952* (Paris: Sylvie Messinger, 1983), 156–58. The Moroccans and Tunisians also emphasized the international aspect of their independence struggle, and they, too, sought to exert pressure on France’s allies by pointing to the danger of communist expansion in North Africa. See Allal al-Fassi, *The Independence Movements in Arab North Africa, 1948* (New York: Octagon Books, 1970), 381–94, and Habib Bourguiba’s July 1946 letter to Ferhat Abbas, reprinted in Samya El Méchat, *Tunisie, Les Chemins vers l’Indépendance, 1945–1956* (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1992), 259–63.

<sup>12</sup>The proclamation is reprinted in Harbi, *Les Archives*, 101–103.

<sup>13</sup>M’Hammed Yazid, “Rapport,” July 1957, in Harbi, *Les Archives*, 172–73.

<sup>14</sup>*Ibid.* See also Hocine Aït Ahmed, “Bandoeng Trente Ans Après,” *Jeune Afrique*, no. 1272 (1985), 18.

<sup>15</sup>Khider to Djouad Zakari, 14 December 1954, Centre National des Archives Algériennes (hereafter, CNA), Algiers, Le Fond du GPRA, MAE, dossier 1; Hoppenot to Mendès France, 5 January 1955, MAE, Série ONU, dossier 546; Mendès France to Mitterrand, Service de l’Algérie, 13 January 1955, no. 189, *ibid.*

<sup>16</sup>Mendès France to Mitterrand, 13 January 1955, no. 327, MAE, Série ONU, dossier 546; Gillet to Mendès France, 11 December 1954, *ibid.*

<sup>17</sup>Mohamad Fathi al-Dib, *Abdel Nasser et la Révolution Algérienne* (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1985), 23.

<sup>18</sup>225th Meeting of the NSC, 24 November 1954, *FRUS* 1952–54, vol. 2, 792.

<sup>19</sup>Yazid, “Rapport,” 173; El Méchat, *Tunisie, Les Chemins vers l’Indépendance*, 231–33; Aït Ahmed, “Bandoeng,” 18–19.

<sup>20</sup>Philippe Tripier, *Autopsie de la guerre d’Algérie* (Paris: Editions France-Empire, 1972), 211; John Talbot, *The War Without a Name: France in Algeria, 1954–1962* (New York: Knopf, 1980), 53.

<sup>21</sup>Tripier, *Autopsie*, 210–12; Langlais to Algiers, 4 September 1958, MAE, Série ONU, dossier 557.

<sup>22</sup>Clark to Dulles, 19 September 1955, U.S. National Archives (hereafter, USNA), College Park, Md., RG59, Central Decimal Files, 751S.00. For other examples, see Dillon to Dulles, 25 July and 16 November 1956, *ibid.*

<sup>23</sup>Lodge to Dulles, 1 November 1955, *FRUS* 1955–57, vol. 18, 230. U.S. military aid was rapidly winding down in the aftermath of the Indochina war, though Paris sought approval for the transfer of previously supplied equipment.

<sup>24</sup>Clark to Dulles, 23 September 1955, USNA, RG59, Central Decimal Files, 751S.00; Slimane Chikh, *L'Algérie en Armes, ou, Le Temps des Certitudes* (Algiers: Office des Publications Universitaires, 1981), 421.

<sup>25</sup>Aït Ahmed to Margaret Pope, 15 October 1955, Aït Ahmed personal papers; Guiringaud to Pinay, 4 October 1955, MAE, Série ONU, dossier 546; Aït Ahmed, interview, Lausanne, August 1998.

<sup>26</sup>Dixon to Macmillan, 1 October 1955, Public Record Office (hereafter, PRO), Kew, U.K., PREM 11/902.

<sup>27</sup>267th Meeting of the NSC, 21 November 1955, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library (hereafter, DDEL), Abilene, Kans., Ann Whitman File (hereafter, AWF), NSC Series.

<sup>28</sup>Memorandum of Conversation (Memcon) Root, Bovey, Loomam, and Aït Ahmed, 5 December 1955, USNA, RG59, Central Decimal Files, 751S.00; Memcon Aït Ahmed, Bovey, 16 May 1956, *ibid.*

<sup>29</sup>Memcon Nes, Allen, Ben Bella, Ali Hawazi, 6 December 1955, USNA, RG59, Central Decimal Files, 751S.00; Chase to Dulles, 25 February 1956, USNA, RG59, Central Decimal Files, 751S.00.

<sup>30</sup>See, for instance, Dulles to Dillon, 27 May 1955, *FRUS* 1955–57, vol. 18, 219–20.

<sup>31</sup>Dillon to Dulles, 4 October 1955, *FRUS* 1955–57, vol. 18, 222–24. On the double game, see Pierre Mélandri, “La France et le ‘Jeu Double’ des États Unis,” in *La Guerre d'Algérie et les Français*, ed. Jean-Pierre Rioux (Paris: Fayard, 1990), 429–50.

<sup>32</sup>Dillon to State, 21 February 1956, USNA, RG59, Central Decimal Files, 751S.00. On Morocco's and Tunisia's use of U.S. aid to win greater autonomy from France, see I. William Zartman, *Morocco: Problems of a New Power* (New York: Atherton Press, 1964), 27, and Carol Mae Barker, “The Politics of Decolonization in Tunisia: The Foreign Policy of a New State,” (PhD. diss., Columbia University, 1971), 240–41, 349.

<sup>33</sup>Dillon to Dulles, 2 March 1956, *FRUS* 1955–57, vol. 18, 115–16.

<sup>34</sup>Dillon to Dulles, 4 February 1956, USNA, RG59, Central Decimal Files, 751S.00.

<sup>35</sup>Thomas Brady, “Tunisian Rebukes U.S. on Aid Policy,” *New York Times*, 11 May 1957, 1, 6.

<sup>36</sup>“Text of Address by Ambassador Dillon on North Africa,” *New York Times*, 21 March 1956, 4.

<sup>37</sup>Aït Ahmed to Khider, 7 April 1956, CNA, GPRA, dossier 1.

<sup>38</sup>Pineau to Mollet, 14 March 1956, MAE, Secrétariat Général, dossier 56; Keith Kyle, *Suez* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1991), 116; *L'Année Politique, 1956* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1957), 279–80.

<sup>39</sup>Al-Dib, *Abdel Nasser*, 120–21; Harbi, *Le FLN: Mirage et Réalité* (Paris: Editions Jeune Afrique, 1980), 174.

<sup>40</sup>Khider to Aït Ahmed and Yazid, 9 May 1956, CNA, GPRA, dossier 2.

<sup>41</sup>Al-Dib, *Abdel Nasser*, 123–32. It is not clear whether the Egyptians actually offered this deal. But Mollet did publicly reaffirm his opposition to the Baghdad Pact, betraying a commitment to Anthony Eden: Kyle, *Suez*, 116; see also Chauvel to Massigli, 15 March 1956, MAE, René Massigli Papers, vol. 95.

<sup>42</sup>Charles G. Cogan, “The Suez Crisis: Part I, The View from Paris,” paper presented at a conference on the Suez Crisis and Its Teachings, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Cambridge, Mass., 15–16 February 1997, 18.

<sup>43</sup>Matti Golan, *Shimon Peres*, trans. Ina Friedman (London: Wiedenfeld and Nicolson, 1982), 36.

<sup>44</sup>Zachary Karabell, “The Suez Crisis: Part I, The View from Israel,” paper presented at a conference on the Suez Crisis and Its Teachings, 14–15; Cogan, “The View from Paris,” 18–19. For French intelligence reports that would suggest new—and well-informed—sources, see the unsigned “Note” by Sous-Direction de Tunisie, 5 March 1956, MAE, Cabinet du Ministre, dossier 157, Tunisie; “Note sur les ingérences égyptiennes en Afrique du Nord,” 20 October 1956, MAE, Cabinet du Ministre, dossier 155, Algérie, Loi Cadre.

<sup>45</sup>Cogan, “The View from Paris,” 17–18; Kyle, *Suez*, 117–18.

<sup>46</sup>Al-Dib, *Abdel Nasser*, 145–49.

<sup>47</sup>Memcon Mollet, Eden, 11 March 1956, *Documents Diplomatiques Français*, 1956, vol. 1, no. 161 (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1988) (hereafter, *DDF*, with year and volume); Cogan, "The View from Paris," 3. See Matthew Connelly, "Taking off the Cold War Lens: Visions of North-South Conflict During the Algerian War for Independence," *American Historical Review* 105 (2000): 739–69, for how images and ideas about Africa and Islam helped to shape French policy.

<sup>48</sup>Bernard Droz and Evelyne Lever, *Histoire de la guerre d'Algérie (1954–1962)* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1982), 103.

<sup>49</sup>The platform was released in November 1956 and is reprinted in Tripier, *Autopsie*, 571–601.

<sup>50</sup>*Ibid.*, 578–79, 598–600.

<sup>51</sup>*Ibid.*, 583.

<sup>52</sup>Guy Pervillé, "L'insertion internationale du F.L.N. algérien," *Relations Internationales* 31 (1982): 374, 377; Richard J. Barnet, *Intervention and Revolution: The United States in the Third World*, rev. ed. (New York: Mentor, New American Library, 1972), 316–17.

<sup>53</sup>Tripier, *Autopsie*, 600; Khider to Aït Ahmed; 1 August 1956, CNA, GPRA, dossier 1; Mabrouk Belhocine, interview, Algiers, December 1999.

<sup>54</sup>Dillon to Dulles, 31 October 1956, USNA, RG59, Central Decimal Files, 651.71.

<sup>55</sup>Memcon Bovey, Abbas et al., 29 November 1956, *FRUS* 1955–57, vol. 18, 255–58; Wall, "The United States, Algeria," 493–94.

<sup>56</sup>Tripier, *Autopsie*, 78–79.

<sup>57</sup>"Directive number 9" (fall 1956), as quoted in Jacques Duchemin, *Histoire du FLN* (Paris: La Table Ronde, 1962), 263–64.

<sup>58</sup>Georges-Picot to Pineau, 4 January 1957, *DDF* 1957, vol. 1, no. 17.

<sup>59</sup>Yves Courrière, *Le Temps des Léopards, La Guerre d'Algérie* (Paris: Fayard, 1970), 2:448–50, 473. See also Tripier, *Autopsie*, 130.

<sup>60</sup>Courrière, *Le Temps des Léopards*, 2:516–17; Henri Alleg, *La guerre d'Algérie* (Paris: Temps actuels, 1981), 2:466–69; Gilles Manceron and Hassan Remaoun, *D'une rive à l'autre: La Guerre d'Algérie de la mémoire à l'histoire* (Paris: Syros, 1993), 177–78.

<sup>61</sup>"Minute" from the Secrétariat des conférences to Georges-Picot, 23 January 1957, MAE, Série ONU, dossier 549.

<sup>62</sup>Douglas Porch, *The French Secret Services: From the Dreyfus Affair to the Gulf War* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1995), 366.

<sup>63</sup>Bureau de New York, "Rapport d'Activité," 18 February 1957, CNA, GPRA, dossier 4.5; Vaur to Langlais, 15 March 1958, MAE, MLA, propagande, dossier 1; "Le Cabinet du Ministre Résident et les titres d'ouvrages et de brochures qu'il a diffusés depuis 15 mois" (n.d., but c. early 1957), Archives Nationales, Paris, Bidault Papers, 457AP, box 110.

<sup>64</sup>"Note: La Question Algérienne à la XIème Session de l'Assemblée Générale," 9 March 1957, MAE, Série ONU, dossier 551.

<sup>65</sup>Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria, 1954–1962*, rev. ed. (New York: Penguin, 1987), 224.

<sup>66</sup>De Guiringaud to Pineau, 3 April 1957, *DDF* vol. 1, no. 290; Pineau circular, 13 April 1957, *ibid.*, no. 312.

<sup>67</sup>Baraduc to Gorlin, 22 March 1958, AOM, 12/CAB/234.

<sup>68</sup>Alphand to Pineau, 14 June 1957, MAE, MLA, vol. 23 bis. (provisoire), Action extérieure, Etats-Unis, December 1956–December 1957, Cote EU.

<sup>69</sup>Baraduc to Gorlin, 22 March 1958.

<sup>70</sup>Vaur to Pineau, 6 October 1958, MAE, Série ONU, dossier 559.

<sup>71</sup>Alphand to Baraduc, 14 June 1957, MAE, Direction Amérique 1952–63, Etats-Unis–Afrique du Nord, dossier 32.

<sup>72</sup>"Note sur le rôle réservé par le F.L.N. à la Presse, au profit de sa propagande," 11 May 1957, MAE, Série ONU, dossier 544; "Exploitation de la Presse par la Propagande du FLN," n.d., MAE, MLA, propagande, dossier 2; Lebel to Langlais, 16 June 1959, MAE, MLA, vol. 24 (provisoire), Action extérieure, Etats-Unis, January 1958–June 1959, Cote ML 4.

<sup>73</sup>Jones to Dulles, 4 September 1957, *FRUS* 1955–57, vol. 18, 679–80.

<sup>74</sup>Diary entry, 14 November 1957, *FRUS* 1955–57, vol. 18, 758–61. Both the French and the Americans were influenced by their experience with Egypt, which first turned to the Soviets after Washington refused

to deliver new weaponry. For a more extended analysis, see Matthew Connelly, "The Algerian War for Independence: An International History" (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1997), 289–311.

<sup>75</sup>Accounts of the Sakiet crisis can be found in Wall, "The United States, Algeria," 503–11, and Matthew Connelly, "The French–American Conflict over North Africa and the Fall of the Fourth Republic," *Revue française d'histoire d'outre-mer* 84 (1997): 20–27.

<sup>76</sup>Tripier, *Autopsie*, 163–66; *L'Année Politique, 1958* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1959), 249–50.

<sup>77</sup>Mélandri, "La France et le 'Jeu Double'," 429–33; Müller, "Le réalisme de la République fédérale," 418–21; Rainero, "L'Italie entre amitié française et solidarité algérienne," 394–95, all in Rioux, *La Guerre*. Regarding Britain, see Martin Thomas, *The French North African Crisis: Colonial Breakdown and Anglo-French Relations, 1945–62* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000).

<sup>78</sup>Dejean to Pineau, 17 March 1958, MAE, Europe 1944–60, URSS, dossier 271.

<sup>79</sup>Alphand to MAE, 5 March 1958, Direction Amérique 1952–63, Etats-Unis–Algérie, dossier 33 (provisoire). On U.S. economic leverage, see Connelly, "French–American Conflict," 9–27.

<sup>80</sup>Beeley to Lloyd, 12 March 1958, PRO, PREM 11/2561.

<sup>81</sup>Houghton to State, 1 May 1958, USNA, RG59, Central Decimal Files, 751.00.

<sup>82</sup>For a discussion of de Gaulle's Algeria policy, see Connelly, "Algerian War," chap. 7.

<sup>83</sup>Quamrane to the Comité de Coordination et d'Exécution (or CCE, the FLN's highest decision-making body), 8 July 1958, in Harbi, *Les Archives*, 189–93. Regarding Tunisia and Morocco, see the *procès-verbaux* of the June 1958 Tunis conference, reprinted in Harbi, *Les Archives*, 414–26.

<sup>84</sup>The study is reprinted in Hocine Aït Ahmed, *La Guerre et l'Après-guerre* (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1964), 9–57. In his Introduction, Aït Ahmed doubts that his study ever reached the CCE, but Quamrane attached it to his report, and its influence is evident in the "Rapport de la Commission gouvernementale sur la Formation d'un Gouvernement provisoire de l'Algérie libre," 6 September 1958, reprinted in Harbi, *Les Archives*, 210–14. Aït Ahmed first suggested forming a provisional government in August 1956: see Khider to Aït Ahmed, 17 August 1956, CNAA, GPRA, dossier 1.

<sup>85</sup>Quamrane to CCE, 8 July 1958, 191–92; Aït Ahmed, *La Guerre*, 25.

<sup>86</sup>Aït Ahmed, *La Guerre*, 25–29, 33–36, 55.

<sup>87</sup>Parodi to MAE, 18 September 1958, MAE, MLA, Action Extérieure, Maroc, dossier 48.

<sup>88</sup>"Liste des Etats Ayant Reconnu le G.P.R.A.," 22 November 1961, MAE, Secrétariat d'Etat aux Affaires algériennes (hereafter, SEAA), dossier 6.

<sup>89</sup>"Les animateurs de la Rébellion Algérienne," 16 October 1958, MAE, Série ONU, dossier 560.

<sup>90</sup>See SDECE note number 23754/A in MAE, SEAA, dossier 6, and the "Condense des Renseignements" for Debré, Division Renseignement, Etat-Major général de la défense nationale, 10 November 1959, MAE, MLA, Action Extérieure, R.F.A., dossier 4.

<sup>91</sup>Pervillé, "L'insertion internationale," 375–77. See also Chikh, *L'Algérie en Armes*, 418–19.

<sup>92</sup>The emphasis is in the original: Lakhdar Bentobbal, "Plan d'organisation pour l'Organisation politique," 12 November 1960, CNAA, GPRA, dossier 8.2.

<sup>93</sup>"Les Dépenses du FLN à l'Extérieur de l'Algérie," Delegation Générale du Gouvernement en Algérie, Bureau d'Etudes, 2 May 1960, AOM, 14/CAB/193; "Les Dépenses du FLN à l'Intérieur de l'Algérie," 16 April 1960, AOM, 14/CAB/48.

<sup>94</sup>Jebb, "Record of conversation with General De Gaulle," 20 March 1958, PRO, PREM 11/2339.

<sup>95</sup>"Mr. Dillon's Interview with General de Gaulle on January 10th," attached to Jebb to Lloyd, 18 January 1957, PRO, PREM 11/2338.

<sup>96</sup>De Gaulle to Eisenhower, 17 September 1958, *FRUS* 1958–60, vol. 7, 81–83. Regarding the Algerian motive behind de Gaulle's tripartite proposal, see Connelly, "Algerian War," 380–86, and Irwin M. Wall, "Les Relations Franco-Américaines et la Guerre d'Algérie 1956–1960," *Revue d'Histoire diplomatique* 110 (1996): 79–80.

<sup>97</sup>Mostefai, "Quelques idées sur les tâches actuelles," 22 December 1958, CNAA, GPRA, dossier 5.3; Abbas, "Rapport de Politique Générale," 20 June 1959, *idem*; "L'Algérie et l'Actualité internationale," c. January 1959, *ibid.*, dossier 8.2.

<sup>98</sup>"Question Algérienne," n.d. (c. January 1959), MAE, Série ONU, dossier 557; Georges-Picot to Couve, 16 December 1958, *ibid.*

<sup>99</sup>Caccia to Lloyd, 25 October 1958, PRO, PREM 11/3002. For other reasons that the United States would not support de Gaulle on Algeria, see Mélandri, "La France et le 'Jeu Double,'" 440–42.



<sup>100</sup>Memcon Herter, Alphand, 3 March 1959, USNA, RG59, Records of the Policy Planning Staff 1957–61, lot 67D548, box 136, France; Lyon to Herter, 6 March 1959, *FRUS* 1958–60, vol. 7, 185–86.

<sup>101</sup>Memcon Debré, Couve et al., 14 March 1959, MAE, Cabinet du Ministre, Cabinet de Couve de Murville, dossier 212bis, Algérie confidentiel. See also “Instruction: Lutte contre les activités du F.L.N. à l'étranger,” 2 April 1959, AOM, 14/CAB/177.

<sup>102</sup>Mohamed Bedjaoui, *La Révolution algérienne et le droit* (Brussels: International Association of Democratic Lawyers, 1961), 124–27.

<sup>103</sup>“Note,” 8 August 1959, MAE, Secrétariat Général, dossier 60.

<sup>104</sup>Memcon Verdier, Ritter von Lex et al., 18 November 1958, MAE, MLA, Action Extérieure, R.F.A., dossier 2; Seydoux to Couve, 16 April and 22 April 1959, *ibid.*, dossier 3; Porch, *French Secret Services*, 371–72; Müller, “Le réalisme de la République fédérale,” 424–28.

<sup>105</sup>Memcon de Gaulle, Castiella, 5 September 1959, MAE, Secrétariat Général, dossier 60.

<sup>106</sup>Alain Peyrefitte, *C'était de Gaulle* (Paris: Fayard, 1994), 59.

<sup>107</sup>Charles de Gaulle, *Discours et Messages: Avec le Renouveau, Mai 1958–Juillet 1962* (Paris: Plon, 1970), 117–23; Jean Lacouture, *De Gaulle: 3. Le Souverain, 1959–1970* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1986), 69–71.

<sup>108</sup>417th Meeting of the NSC, 18 August 1959, DDEL, AWF, NSC Series.

<sup>109</sup>“Note: la question à la XIV<sup>ème</sup> session . . .,” 23 July 1959, MAE, Série ONU, dossier 561. See also “Schéma d'un plan d'action,” 5 June 1959, *ibid.*

<sup>110</sup>Tripier, *Autopsie*, 331–38; Harbi, *Le FLN: Mirage*, 244–50; Commandement en Chef des Forces en Algérie, “Evolution de la situation militaire en Algérie,” July 1959, Service Historique de l'Armée de Terre (hereafter, SHAT), Paris, 1H, 1751, dossier 2.

<sup>111</sup>Abbas, “Rapport de Politique,” 20 June 1959 CNA, GPRA, dossier 5.8; Yazid to Krim, Bentobal, and Boussouf, “La Politique Nord-Africaine,” 6 September 1959, CNA, GPRA, dossier 17.2.

<sup>112</sup>Essig to Delouvrier, 13 January 1960, AOM, 14/CAB/142.

<sup>113</sup>Debaghine to GPRA, 27 October 1959, CNA, GPRA, dossier 5.3; Debaghine to GPRA, 17 November 1959, in Harbi, *Les Archives*, 272–74.

<sup>114</sup>Krim, “Notre Politique extérieure et la Guerre froide,” 13 March 1960, CNA, GPRA, dossier 5.3.

<sup>115</sup>Krim, “Note sur Notre Politique Actuelle,” “Notre Politique à Moyen Orient,” “Note sur Notre Politique dans le bloc Afro-Asiatique,” all dated 13 March 1960, CNA, GPRA, dossier 5.10.

<sup>116</sup>Memcon Krim, Boussouf, Francis, and Ho Long, 1 May 1960, CNA, GPRA, dossier 5.12.

<sup>117</sup>*Ibid.* Adda Benguetat and Cherif Guellal, “Rapport,” c. March 1958, CNA, GPRA, dossier 3.3.

<sup>118</sup>Dejean to Couve, 28 May 1960, MAE, MLA, Action Extérieure, URSS, dossier 87.

<sup>119</sup>Dillon to Houghton, 11 October 1960, USNA, RG59, Central Decimal Files, 651.51s.

<sup>120</sup>Abbas to Zhou Enlai, 24 October 1960, in Harbi, *Les Archives*, 527–28; Chauvel to Couve, 27 October 1960, *DDF* 1960, vol. 2, no. 186; Macmillan to Lloyd, 28 October 1960, PRO, FO 371, 147351; Memcon Macmillan, Home, Hassan, 28 October 1960, PRO, PREM 11/3200; Raoul Duval to Couve, 17 November 1960, MAE, Asie-Océanie 1956–67, Chine, dossier 523.

<sup>121</sup>“Entrevue avec Moulay El Hassan,” 21 October 1960, CNA, GPRA, dossier 8.4; “Rapport du Ministre des Affaires Extérieures sur son Séjour au Maroc,” c. October 1960, *ibid.*

<sup>122</sup>“Note pour le Ministre,” 26 October 1960, MAE, Cabinet du Ministre, Cabinet de Couve de Murville, dossier 212bis, Algérie 1959–62; Bérard to Couve, 1 November 1960, *ibid.*; Alphand to Couve, 3 November 1960, *ibid.*; De Gaulle, *Discours*, 257–62. It is, of course, difficult to prove that international pressure accounts for this particular decision, and Couve de Murville was at pains to correct the impression that the timing had created—even while admitting to his American counterpart that the policy shift was “in line with your concern”: Couve to Herter, 7 November 1960, MAE, Cabinet du Ministre, Cabinet de Couve de Murville, dossier 212bis, Algérie 1959–62. For a more detailed discussion of the importance of international, and especially American, pressure on de Gaulle's policy, see Connelly, “Algerian War,” chap. 7 and 8.

<sup>123</sup>Lacouture, *Le Souverain*, 136; Carbonnel to Bérard, 6 October 1960, MAE, Cabinet du Ministre, Cabinet de Couve de Murville, dossier 212bis, Algérie 1959–62.

<sup>124</sup>Memcon Tito, Abbas et al., 12 April 1961, in Harbi, *Les Archives*, 509; Bentobbal, “Directives Générales.”

<sup>125</sup>Comité Central de l'Information, “Procès-Verbal,” 19 August 1960, AOM, 14/CAB/177; Delegation Générale du Gouvernement en Algérie, Affaires Politiques, “Rapport Mensuel sur l'évolution de la situation générale,” 13 September 1960, AOM, 15/CAB/74; Bernard Tricot, *Les Sentiers de la Paix: Algérie 1958/*

1962 (Paris: Plon, 1972), 194; Bentobbal, "Directives Générales"; Richard Mahoney, *JFK: Ordeal in Africa* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 22.

<sup>126</sup>Lacouture, *Le Souverain*, 137–41.

<sup>127</sup>Note: a/s l'Inde et la question algérienne," 10 March 1961, MAE, Asie 1944 . . . , Inde 1956–67, dossier 248; Bérard to Couve, 21 December 1960, AOM, 15/CAB/149.

<sup>128</sup>Lieutenant-Colonel Thozet, "La Politique du GPRA de la 15<sup>e</sup> session de l'Assemblée Générale des Nations Unies a l'ouverture des pourparlers d'Evian," 14 June 1961, SHAT, 1H, 1111/3.

<sup>129</sup>Janet Flanner, *Paris Journal*, ed. William Shawn, vol. 2: 1956–65 (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1988), 162.

<sup>130</sup>See, for instance, Joxe to de Gaulle, 3 June 1961, MAE, Cabinet du Ministre, Cabinet de Couve de Murville, dossier 212bis.

<sup>131</sup>Jean Lacouture, *Algérie, La Guerre est finie* (Brussels: Editions Complexe, 1985), 11.

<sup>132</sup>Charles-Robert Ageron, "'L'Algérie dernière chance de la puissance française,' Etude d'un mythe politique (1954–1962)," *Relations internationales* 57 (1989): 113–39.

<sup>133</sup>*Islam in the Modern World and Other Studies* (London: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1980), 213–14.

<sup>134</sup>Nelson Mandela, *Long Walk to Freedom* (New York: Little Brown, 1995), 259–60, and testimony at the Rivonia Trial, 1963–64, track 11.1 *Apartheid and the History of the Struggle for Freedom in South Africa*, CD-ROM (Bellville, South Africa: Mayibuye Center, University of the Western Cape, 1993). On Arafat, see Alan Hart, *Arafat: A Political Biography* (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1994), 102–104, 112–13, 129–30; Barry Rubin, *Revolution Until Victory? The Politics and History of the PLO* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994), 7, 10. On Algiers as a Mecca, see John P. Entelis, *Algeria: The Revolution Institutionalized* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1986), 189.